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I)	  Introduction:	  Ever	  since	  their	  creation	  over	  500	  years	  ago,	  patents	  have	  mostly	  existed	  to	  provide	  incentives	  for	  innovation.	  	  In	  the	  modern	  era,	  a	  patent	  rewards	  an	  inventor	  for	  his	  invention	  if	  it	  meets	  the	  criteria	  of	  being new,	  useful,	  and	  non-­‐obvious.	  If	  these	  criteria	  are	  all	  satisfied,	  the	  government	  can	  grant	  a	  temporary	  monopoly	  to	  the	  inventor.	  This	  temporary	  monopoly	  aims	  to	  adequately	  remunerate	  the	  inventor	  for	  the	  invention.	  While	  there	  may	  be	  an	  overall	  societal	  increase	  in	  welfare	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  invention,	  during	  the	  life	  of	  the	  patent,	  the	  producer	  captures	  much	  of	  the	  increase.	  Reflecting	  the	  common	  economic	  view	  on	  patents,	  F.M.	  Scherer	  states	  that	  they	  “confer	  social	  gains	  by	  making	  innovations	  profitable,	  and	  by	  stimulating	  innovators	  to	  carry	  their	  cost	  –	  reducing	  efforts	  further,	  but	  they	  impose	  social	  losses	  by	  requiring	  consumers	  to	  wait	  longer	  for	  the	  competitive	  fall	  in	  prices”	  (Scherer,	  1977).	  Often,	  it	  is	  only	  after	  the	  expiration	  of	  the	  patent	  that	  the	  consumer	  reaps	  much	  of	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  innovation.	  	   The	  existence	  of	  patents	  has	  not	  tended	  to	  be	  contentious,	  with	  it	  being	  widely	  accepted	  that	  patents	  serve	  as	  a	  blunt	  tool	  to	  promote	  innovation.	  But	  this	  comes	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  dampening	  the	  welfare	  of	  both	  competitors	  and	  consumers,	  as	  described	  above.	  This	  loss	  to	  consumers	  and	  competition	  has	  been	  accepted	  as	  a	  necessary	  cost	  to	  stimulate	  innovation.	  	  Scherer	  lays	  out	  the	  issue	  of	  optimal	  patent	  protection	  clearly,	  stating	  that	  the	  goal	  “of	  patent	  policy	  is to	  strike	  a	  balance:	  enough	  protection	  to	  sustain	  a	  desired	  flow	  of	  innovations,	  but	  not	  superfluous	  protection	  in	  view	  of	  alternate	  incentives	  for	  innovation	  and	  the	  social	  burdens	  monopoly	  power	  imposes”	  (Scherer,	  1977).	  While	  his	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conclusion	  does	  capture	  well	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  the	  patent	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	  it	  inadequately	  captures	  the	  social	  problems	  associated	  with	  monopoly	  power	  on	  pharmaceuticals	  more	  specifically.	  	  When	  a	  new	  drug	  hits	  the	  market,	  it	  means	  better	  options	  for	  those	  who	  can	  afford	  the	  new	  drug.	  However,	  the	  monopoly	  makes	  the	  new	  product	  both	  expensive	  and	  scarce.	  	  Therefore,	  when	  individuals	  are	  unable	  to	  pay	  monopoly	  costs	  associated	  with	  the	  new	  drug,	  the	  social	  cost	  is	  that	  they	  are	  left	  with	  lower	  quality	  drugs	  (or	  no	  drugs	  at	  all).	  Since	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  higher	  quality	  medication,	  these	  individuals	  have	  worse	  health	  outcomes	  than	  the	  individuals	  who	  can	  afford	  to	  pay.	  On	  a	  moral	  and	  a	  social	  level,	  this	  outcome	  is neither	  optimal	  nor	  desirable.	  	  However,	  if	  the	  patent	  system	  were	  not	  in	  place,	  the	  lack	  of	  incentives	  to	  innovate	  could	  mean	  no	  new	  drugs	  in	  the	  market	  at	  all.	  This	  would	  mean	  reduced	  outcome	  for	  all.	  So,	  in	  principle,	  if	  there	  was	  some	  system	  where	  the	  patent	  system	  was	  in	  place	  but	  also	  allowed	  for	  specific	  cases	  of	  voiding	  the	  patents	  for	  patient	  use	  in	  epidemics,	  that	  would	  be	  the	  most	  beneficial	  for	  citizens	  while	  also	  keeping	  the	  drug	  companies’	  incentive	  to	  innovate.	  Historically,	  many	  nations	  have	  hesitated	  to	  patent	  pharmaceuticals	  because	  that	  did	  not	  align	  with	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  developing	  nation	  (Boulet,	  2000).	  	  The	  lack	  of	  pharmaceutical	  patents	  has,	  however,	  grown	  increasingly	  rare	  in	  a	  more	  global	  patent	  landscape	  that	  has	  created	  international	  minimum	  standards	  for	  patent	  protection.	  	  Attempting	  to	  balance	  social	  responsibility	  and	  monopoly	  incentives	  highlights	  the	  patent	  system’s	  inability	  to	  deal	  with	  situational	  ethics.	  While	  the	  current	  patent	  systems	  are	  well	  functioning	  for	  almost	  all	  industries,	  the	  ethics	  surrounding	  pharmaceutical	  patents	  are	  far	  more	  serious	  than	  for	  other	  industries.	  The	  problem	  
	   3	  
faced	  is to	  choose	  between	  reducing	  patent	  protection,	  which	  may	  be	  a	  disincentive	  to	  innovate,	  or	  not	  reducing	  protection	  and	  allowing	  individuals	  to	  suffer.	  In	  this	  regard,	  traditional	  patent	  law	  is silent.	  Compulsory	  licenses,	  which	  are	  granted	  by	  a	  government	  to	  allow	  someone	  else	  to	  produce	  the	  patented	  product	  or	  process	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  patent	  owner	  (WTO-­‐1,	  2006),	  attempt	  to	  find	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  public	  health	  problem	  while	  still	  allowing	  patents	  on	  pharmaceuticals.	  Hopefully	  these	  licenses	  perfectly	  balance	  the	  need	  for	  strong	  international	  patent	  systems	  while	  still	  providing	  drugs	  to	  those	  who	  need	  them	  in	  times	  of	  emergency.	  	  	   The	  problems	  surrounding	  patents,	  essential	  medicines,	  and	  compulsory	  licenses	  are	  exacerbated	  as	  the	  economy	  becomes	  more	  global	  and	  wealth	  discrepancies	  become	  magnified.	  	  With	  the	  larger	  wealth	  gaps	  and	  a	  pharmaceutical	  pricing	  structure	  unfavorable	  to	  the	  developing	  world,	  whole	  populations	  are	  priced	  out	  of	  the	  market.	  These	  larger	  gaps	  in	  welfare	  serve	  to	  highlight	  the	  need	  for	  solutions	  to	  the	  patent	  problems	  surrounding	  pharmaceuticals,	  since	  pricing	  groups	  of	  people	  out	  of	  the	  market	  is	  a	  sub-­‐optimal	  outcome	  socially.	  	  In	  the	  sections	  that	  follow,	  I	  will	  discuss	  first	  the	  history	  of	  patents	  to	  provide	  a	  base	  of	  understanding	  for	  the	  modern	  patent	  system.	  	  Second,	  I	  will	  lay	  out	  the	  modern	  international	  patent	  legislation,	  especially	  the	  legislation	  and	  guidelines	  in	  place	  for	  compulsory	  licenses.	  	  Next,	  I	  will	  explain	  previous	  research	  on	  compulsory	  licenses	  and	  describe	  event	  studies	  before	  advancing	  to	  my	  own	  research.	  	  	  	   The	  aim	  of	  my	  thesis	  is	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  announcement	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license	  has	  a	  short-­‐term	  effect	  on	  the	  market	  capitalization	  of	  the	  firm	  whose	  drug	  is	  licensed.	  Previous	  research,	  as	  discussed	  in	  my	  literature	  review,	  has	  examined	  the	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effects	  of	  compulsory	  licenses	  on	  R&D	  expenditure	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  an	  issuance	  on	  the	  country.	  However,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  issuing	  a	  compulsory	  license	  affects	  pharmaceutical	  company	  market	  capitalization	  change	  has	  not	  been	  empirically	  studied.	  Answering	  this	  question	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  learn	  whether	  shareholders	  view	  announcements	  of	  these	  licenses	  and	  a	  negative,	  positive,	  or	  irrelevant	  through	  use	  of	  an	  event	  study	  methodology.	  The	  investigation	  and	  results	  of	  this	  research	  will	  help	  paint	  a	  more	  complete	  picture	  surrounding	  compulsory	  licenses	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  firms.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  results	  were	  overwhelmingly	  insignificant,	  underscoring	  the	  need	  for	  policy	  reexamination	  toward	  these	  compulsory	  licenses.	  	  Historically,	  companies	  have	  viewed	  compulsory	  license	  as	  a	  bad	  outcome,	  penalizing	  countries	  that	  use	  and	  abuse	  the	  compulsory	  license	  system.	  The	  results	  suggest	  that	  companies	  should	  perhaps	  not	  be	  so	  worried	  or	  care	  so	  much	  about	  compulsory	  licenses.	  Hopefully	  these	  results	  will	  catalyze	  a	  change	  in	  outlook	  toward	  compulsory	  licenses.	  	  
II)	  Background:	  
A)	  Patent	  History:	  Prior	  to	  the	  Venetian	  Patent	  Statute,	  passed	  on	  March	  19th,	  1474	  by	  the	  Venetian	  Legislature,	  patents	  served	  more	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  monopoly	  enforcement	  and	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  Venetian	  state	  and	  less	  as	  incentives	  for	  innovation	  (Nard,	  2006).	  Prior	  to	  this	  statute,	  the	  granting	  of	  patents	  was not	  common	  practice.	  In	  his	  1964	  book	  titled	  “Genesis	  of	  American	  Patent	  and	  Copyright	  Law,”	  Bruce	  Willis	  Bugbee	  found	  13	  patents	  issued	  between	  1416	  and	  1472	  (Bugbee,	  1967).	  Before	  the	  statute,	  patents	  functioned	  to	  grant	  a	  monopoly	  for	  individuals	  on	  resources	  rather	  than	  to	  grant	  the	  control	  of	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their	  inventions	  to	  inventors.	  At	  least	  half	  of	  those	  patents	  issued	  before	  1474	  were	  monopolies	  to	  mineral	  companies	  to	  eliminate	  competition.	  These	  monopolies	  were	  justified	  by	  the	  state	  because	  of	  the	  “heavy	  expenses	  required	  for	  the	  works,	  and	  the	  benefits	  flowing	  to	  the	  Republic”(Mandich,	  1948).	  While	  these	  patents	  worked	  for	  both	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  patent	  recipient	  and	  the	  state,	  they	  did	  not	  encourage	  innovation	  nor	  reward	  it.	  	  	  The	  Venetian	  Patent	  Legislation	  of	  1474	  was	  the	  first	  example	  of	  a	  patent	  system	  with	  similar	  scope	  and	  limitations	  to	  our	  modern	  system.	  In	  its	  simplest	  form,	  the	  early	  patent	  legislation	  sought	  to	  encourage	  technological	  advancement	  by	  issuing	  private	  grants	  (patents).	  The	  legislation	  laid	  out	  that	  “by	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  council,	  every	  person	  who	  shall	  build	  any	  new	  and	  ingenious	  device	  in	  this	  City,	  not	  previously	  made	  in	  our	  Commonwealth	  [would	  have	  monopoly	  rights	  over	  the	  invention]	  for	  the	  term	  of	  10	  years”(Mandich,	  1948).	  While	  the	  intellectual	  property	  system	  and	  legislation	  has	  expanded	  significantly	  since	  the	  15th	  century,	  it	  is	  evident	  how	  well	  Venetian	  legislation	  has	  served	  as	  the	  framework	  for	  later	  patent	  systems.	  	  First,	  it	  mentions	  explicitly	  the	  building	  of	  “new	  and	  ingenious”	  inventions.	  	  This	  emphasis	  is	  also	  found	  in	  the	  modern	  patent	  criteria	  of	  both	  new	  and	  non-­‐obviousness.	  	  	  Secondly,	  the	  statute	  allocates	  to	  inventors	  a	  monopoly	  over	  their	  invention	  for	  10	  years.	  	  While	  the	  time	  allotted	  has	  changed	  in	  the	  modern	  era,	  we	  still	  subscribe	  to	  a	  system	  that	  grants	  a	  temporary	  monopoly	  as	  remuneration	  for	  ideas	  and	  R&D	  expenditures.	  Comparing	  the	  Venetian	  system	  to	  our	  modern	  system,	  it	  is	  clear	  how	  the	  Venetian	  statute	  provided	  a	  scaffold	  for	  modern	  patent	  law.	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Using	  the	  Venetian	  Patent	  Statute	  as	  a	  framework,	  many	  nations	  and	  states	  followed	  suit	  and	  built	  their	  own	  domestic	  patent	  systems.	  	  Since	  the	  patent	  system	  was	  still	  in	  its	  infancy,	  it	  was	  susceptible	  to	  abuse	  by	  both	  the	  state	  and	  individuals	  and	  interpreted	  in	  ways	  that	  allowed	  the	  ever-­‐increasing	  abuse.	  Abuses	  eventually	  grew	  to	  the	  point	  where	  counter	  legislation	  was needed,	  such	  as	  the	  Statute	  of	  Monopolies	  in	  England	  in	  1623	  (Machlup,	  1958).	  This	  statute	  forbade	  the	  granting	  of	  broader	  patents	  such	  as	  “exclusive	  rights	  to	  trade”	  except	  to	  individuals	  who	  were the	  “first	  and	  true	  inventor”	  (Machlup,	  1958).	  Given	  the	  emphasis	  placed	  upon	  the	  “first	  and	  true	  inventor,”	  we	  can	  deduce	  that	  the	  use	  of	  patents	  within	  England	  previously	  was not	  in	  a	  manner	  consistent	  with	  the	  Venetian	  Statute.	  Rather,	  it	  was more	  similar	  to	  the	  use	  of	  patents	  within	  Venice	  before	  1474,	  granting	  monopolies	  and	  as	  a	  means	  to	  raise	  money	  for	  the	  crown.	  Other	  domestic	  patent	  law	  systems	  used	  the	  Venetian	  foundation	  to	  create	  patent	  laws	  for	  rewarding	  of	  innovation,	  as	  well.	  	  Even	  the	  US	  Constitution	  (1787)	  addressed	  patents,	  stating	  that	  congress	  has	  the	  power	  “to	  promote	  the	  Progress	  of	  Science	  and	  useful	  Arts,	  by	  securing	  the	  limited	  Times	  to	  Authors	  and	  Inventors	  the	  exclusive	  Right	  to	  their	  respective	  Writings	  and	  Discoveries”(Machlup,	  1958).	  Patent	  laws	  were	  progressively	  more	  detailed	  and	  complete	  than	  the	  original	  Statute	  of	  1474.	  However,	  as	  markets	  became	  more	  global,	  there	  was	  a	  need	  to	  create	  international	  patent	  rights;	  these	  were	  first	  enacted	  during	  the	  Paris	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Industrial	  Property	  in	  1883.	  Eight	  countries	  initially	  ratified	  the	  Paris	  Convention	  in	  1883,	  with	  another	  eight	  ratifying	  it	  before	  1900	  (WIPO).	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   The	  Paris	  Convention	  was	  catalyzed	  by	  the	  ever-­‐increasing	  global	  nature	  of	  markets	  and	  by	  events	  such	  as	  the	  World’s	  Fair	  and	  inventors	  exhibitions.	  During	  the	  1870’s,	  the	  Austro-­‐Hungarian	  Empire	  aimed	  to	  host	  a	  national	  inventors	  exhibition,	  however	  the	  proposed	  event	  was met	  with	  serious	  concern	  by	  the	  international	  inventors’	  community	  (Sell,	  2001).	  Individuals	  were	  worried	  that	  their	  inventions	  would	  be	  stolen	  since	  no	  international	  legislation	  existed	  regarding	  patents.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  empire	  passed	  a	  temporary	  bill	  allowing	  protection	  of	  international	  intellectual	  property	  to	  encourage	  participation.	  	  While	  the	  protection	  resolved	  issues	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  this	  inventors’	  exhibition	  initiated	  the	  debate	  and	  conversation	  surrounding	  international	  patent	  protection.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  Paris	  Convention	  was	  similar	  to	  the	  Venetian	  patent	  system	  but	  with	  an	  additional	  stipulation.	  Since	  this	  patent	  system	  was	  on	  an	  international	  scale,	  individuals	  could	  get	  a	  patent	  in	  a	  particular	  country	  and,	  theoretically,	  not	  utilize	  it	  and	  block	  progress	  within	  that	  country.	  Because	  of	  that,	  an	  agreement	  was reached	  where	  “foreign	  patents	  [were	  required	  to]	  be	  worked	  in	  order	  to	  be	  valid”(Murphy,	  1994).	  This	  stipulation	  was	  not	  included	  in	  domestic	  documents,	  since	  it	  would	  have	  been	  foolish	  to	  patent	  a	  product	  and	  not	  utilize	  it	  in	  the	  only	  market	  where	  it	  was	  patented.	  With	  the	  addition	  of	  this	  clause,	  the	  potential	  for	  abuse	  of	  the	  international	  patent	  landscape	  was	  mitigated.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  Paris	  Convention	  and	  legislation	  of	  1883	  was	  the	  first	  instance	  of	  compulsory	  license	  discussion	  on	  the	  international	  stage.	  The	  license	  legislation	  was	  enacted	  to	  “respond	  to	  anti-­‐competitive,	  non-­‐working	  or	  blocking	  behavior	  or	  cases	  of	  ‘public	  need’”(Boscheck,	  2012).	  While	  this	  definition	  is	  very	  broad	  and	  non-­‐specific,	  it	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still	  serves	  as	  one	  of	  the	  first,	  and	  certainly	  most	  famous,	  examples	  of	  the	  beginning	  of	  compulsory	  licenses.	  	  Finally,	  it	  clearly	  lays	  out	  the	  intention	  for	  compulsory	  licenses	  to	  be	  a	  checks	  and	  balances	  sort	  of	  measure.	  	  	  With	  the	  framework	  provided	  by	  the	  Paris	  Convention	  in	  mind,	  the	  next	  several	  intellectual	  property	  (IP)	  iterations	  continued	  to	  alter	  the	  patent	  system,	  but	  international	  adoption	  of	  patent	  protection	  was	  incredibly	  different	  across	  countries.	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  when	  comparing	  countries	  with	  different	  levels	  of	  development.	  	  While	  some	  nations	  subscribed	  to	  the	  legislation	  put	  forth	  by	  the	  Paris	  Convention,	  others	  had	  created	  their	  own	  systems,	  additional	  legislation,	  or	  avoided	  patent	  legislation	  all	  together.	  All	  of	  that	  changed,	  however,	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement.	  	  
B)	  Modern	  Patent	  Landscape:	  The	  TRIPs	  Agreement	  and	  more	  	  The	  biggest	  change	  to	  the	  modern	  patent	  landscape	  occurred	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Agreement	  on	  Trade	  Related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  (TRIPS)	  by	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO)	  in	  1995.	  Like	  the	  Paris	  Convention,	  many	  considered	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement	  to	  be	  a	  response	  to	  technological	  changes	  and	  the	  need	  for	  a	  more	  robust	  governance	  regime	  (May,	  2006).	  Among	  other	  broad	  sweeping	  reforms,	  it	  required	  all	  members	  of	  the	  WTO	  to	  begin	  to	  unify	  their	  patent	  protection	  so	  that	  it	  was	  homogenous	  across	  all	  member	  nations.	  For	  example,	  the	  agreement	  required	  all	  members	  to	  recognize	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  product	  patents,	  which	  are	  patents	  on	  inventions.	  Before	  TRIPS,	  many	  nations,	  especially	  developing	  nations,	  only	  recognized	  process	  patents,	  which	  are	  simply	  patents	  on	  methods	  of	  production.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  company	  creates	  a	  new	  compound,	  under	  a	  product	  patent	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system,	  they	  have	  complete	  rights	  over	  the	  compounds	  use.	  If,	  however,	  it	  was	  patented	  in	  a	  process	  patent	  system,	  they	  only	  have	  monopoly	  rights	  over	  the	  specific	  synthesis	  they	  used,	  not	  the	  actual	  compound.	  This	  disregard	  for	  product	  patents	  meant	  that	  pharmaceutical	  innovations	  and	  new	  drug	  compounds	  were	  not	  patentable;	  only	  the	  steps	  of	  formulation	  were	  patentable.	  The	  lack	  of	  product	  patent	  protection	  had	  meant	  a	  decrease	  in	  drug	  price	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  availability,	  along	  with	  a	  disincentive	  to	  innovate	  for	  firms	  looking	  to	  enter	  that	  market	  space.	  As	  domestic	  patent	  landscapes	  became	  more	  homogeneous,	  companies	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  enter	  into	  more	  markets	  with	  greater	  confidence.	  This	  confidence	  stems	  from	  the	  patent	  landscape	  becoming	  more	  protective.	  The	  TRIPS	  agreement	  was,	  as	  one	  article	  puts	  it	  “a	  product	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  whose	  comparative	  advantage	  lay	  in	  innovation	  rather	  than	  imitation”(Sell,	  2001).	  This	  highlights	  the	  essential	  argument,	  by	  opponents,	  that	  TRIPS	  was	  set	  up	  to	  favor	  those	  already	  in	  power	  within	  the	  international	  patent	  landscape.	  Since	  all	  countries	  had	  to	  alter	  (not	  immediately)	  their	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  (IPRs)	  to	  stronger	  patent	  protection	  brought	  forth	  by	  the	  developed	  world,	  suddenly	  certain	  developing	  nations	  had	  less	  ability	  to	  produce	  drugs	  legally	  and	  cheaply	  for	  their	  population.	  This	  occurred	  since	  products	  that	  were	  unpatented	  previously	  became	  protected	  with	  the	  inclusion	  of	  product	  patents.	  While	  there	  was	  no	  grandfathering	  of	  old	  patent	  systems,	  countries	  have	  had	  varying	  timelines	  to	  change	  their	  systems	  based	  on	  levels	  of	  development.	  The	  developing	  nations	  had	  until	  2005	  to	  change	  their	  laws	  to	  the	  standards	  put	  forth	  by	  TRIPS,	  and	  least	  developed	  nations	  have	  been	  granted	  until	  2016	  to	  change	  the	  laws	  as	  they	  regard	  pharmaceutical	  patent	  (WTO-­‐2).	  	  While	  eventually	  the	  leveling	  and	  raising	  of	  minimum	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of	  patent	  protection	  standards	  could	  help	  developing	  world	  industries	  such	  as	  pharmaceuticals,	  the	  short	  run	  effect	  was a	  reduction	  in	  access	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  price	  of	  medication,	  which	  did	  not	  benefit	  developing	  nations.	  	  Since	  most	  of	  the	  legislation	  surrounding	  TRIPS	  benefitted	  firms	  that	  already	  had	  strong	  patent	  protection,	  compulsory	  licenses	  were deemed	  a	  necessary	  tool	  for	  both	  the	  benefit	  of	  developing	  nations	  and	  a	  compromise	  to	  give	  them	  more	  incentive	  to	  agree	  and	  sign.	  The	  TRIPS	  agreement	  laid	  out	  the	  vague	  criteria	  for	  when	  a	  patent	  could	  be	  broken.	  It	  states	  that	  “Members	  may	  exclude	  from	  patentability	  inventions,	  the	  prevention	  within	  their	  territory	  of	  the	  commercial	  exploitation	  of	  which	  is necessary	  to	  protect	  ordre	  public	  or	  morality,	  including	  to	  protect	  human,	  animal	  or	  plant	  life	  or	  health”	  (Article	  27.2)	  This	  sentence,	  while	  written	  with	  clear	  intention,	  is not	  clarified	  anywhere	  within	  TRIPS	  so	  it	  leaves	  itself	  open	  to	  interpretation.	  For	  instance,	  while	  the	  intention	  may	  be	  understandable,	  nowhere	  in	  the	  agreement	  is it	  explained	  what	  constitutes	  the	  protection	  of	  ordre	  public	  or	  morality.	  Additionally,	  what	  constitutes	  commercial	  exploitation	  is	  also	  not	  explained.	  This	  article	  of	  TRIPS,	  while	  dealt	  with	  more	  explicitly	  in	  the	  next	  section	  of	  the	  paper,	  was a	  serious	  point	  of	  contention	  when	  written	  due	  to	  its	  vague	  nature	  and	  potentially	  serious	  opportunity	  for	  abuse.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  signing	  of	  TRIPS,	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  such	  as	  Medecins	  sans	  Frontieres	  (MSF)	  had	  multiple	  issues	  with	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement	  as	  it	  pertained	  to	  global	  health.	  The	  MSF	  argued	  that	  increased	  patent	  protection	  would	  cause	  higher	  drug	  prices.	  These	  higher	  prices	  would	  price	  developing	  nations	  out	  of	  the	  market,	  lower	  sources	  of	  high	  quality	  drugs	  which	  developing	  nations	  had	  been	  relying	  on,	  along	  with	  a	  loss	  of	  jobs	  for	  those	  formerly	  working	  in	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry	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in	  the	  developing	  country.	  Individuals	  and	  nations	  who	  were	  pro	  TRIPS	  touted	  a	  potential	  increase	  in	  the	  availability	  of	  new	  essential	  medicines	  in	  a	  developing	  world	  market	  place,	  but	  there	  can	  be	  a	  difference	  between	  theoretically	  available	  and	  actually	  accessible	  medicines.	  In	  the	  developing	  world	  “the	  drugs	  will	  remain	  out	  of	  reach	  to	  people	  in	  developing	  countries	  because	  of	  high	  prices.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  access	  gap	  between	  developed	  and	  developing	  countries	  will	  widen”	  (Hoen,	  2002)	  	  Examining	  the	  pattern	  of	  R&D	  expenditures	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  TRIPS,	  the	  increased	  standards	  were	  still	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  incentivize	  R&D	  for	  maladies	  that	  most	  affect	  the	  developing	  world	  (Kyle	  &	  McGahan,	  2012).	  Therefore,	  after	  implementing	  TRIPS,	  the	  developing	  world	  was	  forced	  to	  grant	  patents	  and	  accept	  sharp	  price	  increases	  on	  drugs	  which	  they	  formerly	  had	  access	  to,	  without	  significant	  increase	  in	  the	  R&D	  expenditure	  for	  tropical	  diseases	  (Correa,	  2002).	  Although	  the	  concerns	  laid	  out	  by	  MSF	  were	  legitimate	  and	  serious,	  no	  immediate	  legal	  challenges	  arose,	  most	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  lag	  allowed	  for	  updating	  IPRs	  to	  the	  standard	  set	  by	  TRIPS.	  In	  fact,	  it	  took	  until	  1998	  for	  there	  to	  be	  a	  legal	  conflict	  surrounding	  access	  to	  medicine.	  In	  1998,	  the	  South	  African	  government	  passed	  a	  law	  called	  the	  Medicines	  and	  Related	  Substances	  Control	  Amendment	  Act	  that	  was aimed	  at	  increasing	  availability	  of	  affordable	  medicines.	  Issues	  such	  as	  off-­‐patent	  legislation,	  transparent	  pricing	  schemes	  and	  parallel	  importation	  were	  all	  discussed	  in	  the	  act	  (Hoen,	  2002).	  All	  of	  these	  issues	  aimed	  to	  increase	  access	  to	  drugs,	  especially	  HIV	  drugs,	  which	  were	  desperately	  needed.	  Pharmaceutical	  companies,	  along	  with	  the	  backing	  of	  their	  home	  governments,	  wanted	  this	  legislation	  repealed	  given	  that	  it	  would	  be	  detrimental	  to	  their	  business.	  By	  the	  time	  the	  large	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  and	  the	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developed	  nations	  dropped	  their	  lawsuit,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  “the	  flexibilities	  of	  TRIPS	  and	  their	  use	  for	  public	  health	  purposes	  needed	  clarification	  to	  ensure	  that	  developing	  countries	  could	  use	  its	  provisions	  without	  the	  threat	  of	  legal	  or	  political	  challenge”(Hoen,	  2002).	  	  In	  the	  South	  African	  example,	  the	  government	  needed	  AIDS	  medication	  to	  combat	  what	  was clearly	  an	  epidemic	  that	  would	  continue	  to	  grow,	  with	  20%	  of	  all	  pregnant	  South	  African	  mothers	  infected	  with	  HIV	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  legal	  battle.	  	  Even	  though	  this	  situation	  fit	  the	  criteria	  of	  article	  27.2	  of	  TRIPS,	  the	  fact	  that	  large	  corporate	  players	  still	  attempted	  to	  stifle	  the	  dissemination	  of	  cheap	  drugs	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  vague	  wording	  and	  explanation	  within	  TRIPS	  needed	  to	  be	  clarified.	  	  Because	  of	  conflicts	  surrounding	  the	  execution	  of	  country	  rights	  within	  TRIPS,	  there	  was a	  need	  for	  less	  ambiguous	  legislation,	  which	  was	  first	  remedied	  by	  the	  Doha	  Declaration.	  The	  Doha	  Declaration,	  ratified	  by	  the	  WTO	  in	  November	  2001,	  clarified	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  compulsory	  licensing	  and	  other	  methods	  of	  reducing	  the	  price	  of	  drugs	  in	  national	  emergencies.	  Paragraph	  4	  of	  the	  Doha	  Declaration	  states	  “we	  agree	  that	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement	  does	  not	  and	  should	  not	  prevent	  members	  from	  taking	  measures	  to	  protect	  public	  health.	  Accordingly,	  while	  reiterating	  our	  commitment	  to	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement,	  we	  affirm	  that	  the	  agreement	  can	  and	  should	  be	  interpreted	  and	  implemented	  in	  a	  manner	  supportive	  of	  WTO	  members’	  right	  to	  protect	  public	  health	  and,	  in	  particular,	  to	  promote	  access	  to	  medicines	  for	  all.”	  When	  considering	  the	  previous	  legal	  battle	  in	  South	  Africa	  surrounding	  access	  to	  medication,	  this	  paragraph	  aims	  to	  explain	  the	  WTO’s	  stance	  on	  compulsory	  licenses	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  counter	  threats	  to	  and	  remedy	  hazards	  to	  public	  health.	  Building	  upon	  paragraph	  4,	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paragraph	  5b	  states	  that,	  “each	  member	  has	  the	  right	  to	  grant	  compulsory	  licenses	  and	  the	  freedom	  to	  determine	  the	  grounds	  upon	  which	  such	  licenses	  are	  granted.”	  Taken	  together,	  these	  define	  more	  clearly	  the	  clause	  within	  TRIPS	  surrounding	  compulsory	  licenses.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting,	  additionally,	  that	  the	  term	  compulsory	  license	  was never	  in	  fact	  used	  within	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement,	  however	  it	  was explicitly	  used	  within	  the	  Doha	  Declaration	  (Oh,	  2006).	  All	  in	  all,	  the	  Doha	  Declaration	  aimed	  to	  clarify	  any	  ambiguity	  within	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement	  and	  represented	  a	  legislative	  response	  to	  the	  conflict	  that	  occurred	  in	  places	  like	  South	  Africa	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  TRIPS.	  	  Originally,	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement	  stated	  that	  all	  drugs	  affected	  by	  compulsory	  licenses	  must	  be	  manufactured	  within	  the	  country	  itself	  and	  not	  imported	  to	  the	  country,	  however	  this	  changed	  with	  The	  Doha	  Declaration	  and	  the	  amendment	  31bis	  to	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement.	  The	  new	  guidelines	  from	  the	  Doha	  Declaration	  called	  the	  rule	  requiring	  domestic	  production	  into	  question,	  stating	  that	  this	  rule	  could	  prevent	  effective	  use	  of	  the	  compulsory	  license	  if	  a	  country	  couldn’t	  domestically	  manufacture	  the	  drug.	  They	  called	  for	  an	  “expeditious	  solution	  to	  this	  problem.”	  Eventually,	  the	  issue	  of	  manufacturing	  domestically	  was	  cut	  out	  of	  the	  requirements	  for	  a	  compulsory	  license.	  In	  the	  end	  “WTO	  members	  agreed	  to	  relax	  the	  domestic	  production	  rule	  in	  the	  context	  of	  essential	  medicines	  by	  permitting	  the	  manufacture	  and	  export	  of	  products	  from	  a	  non	  [compulsory	  license	  country]	  to	  a	  [compulsory	  license	  country]”	  (R.	  C.	  C.	  Bird,	  Daniel	  R.	  ,	  2008).	  This	  relaxation	  of	  rules	  surrounding	  production	  was	  also	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  amendment	  to	  TRIPS	  within	  article	  31bis.	  	  Ratified	  on	  December	  6th,	  2005,	  article	  31bis	  allowed	  and	  explained	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  developed	  nations	  were allowed	  to	  issue	  compulsory	  licenses	  to	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their	  generic	  manufacturers	  to	  produce	  and	  export	  medications	  to	  developing	  nations.	  As	  laid	  out	  in	  her	  book	  entitled	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Health	  Technologies,”	  Joanna	  Brougher	  explains	  that	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  the	  importation	  of	  drugs	  through	  a	  compulsory	  license,	  multiple	  criteria	  must	  be	  met	  by	  both	  the	  importing	  and	  exporting	  nations.	  The	  importing	  nation	  must	  submit	  a	  notification	  to	  the	  TRIPS	  council	  that	  specifies	  which	  drug	  is	  needed,	  how	  much	  of	  it,	  and	  that	  they	  intend	  to	  issue	  a	  compulsory	  license	  (Brougher,	  2014).	  In	  turn,	  the	  exporting	  nation	  must	  issue	  a	  compulsory	  license	  that	  gives	  them	  the	  right	  to	  produce	  and	  export	  to	  the	  importing	  nation,	  and	  they	  may	  only	  produce	  enough	  to	  satisfy	  the	  importing	  country’s	  demand.	  This	  change	  directly	  affected	  drug	  availability	  and	  alleviated	  many	  of	  the	  problems	  facing	  developing	  nations	  that	  lacked	  the	  production	  capability	  to	  manufacture	  their	  essential	  medicines	  domestically.	  	  While	  this	  amendment	  is understandable	  as	  a	  short	  run	  solution,	  it	  also	  has	  potential	  negative	  consequences	  in	  the	  long	  term	  when	  considering	  the	  effect	  of	  compulsory	  licenses	  on	  incentives	  to	  invest	  in	  manufacturing	  and	  other	  industies.	  If	  a	  country	  in	  question	  can	  outsource	  production	  versus	  creating	  some	  domestically,	  it	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  invest	  in	  domestic	  manufacturing.	  	  The	  relaxing	  of	  the	  requirement	  for	  domestic	  manufacturing	  should	  perhaps	  have	  been	  lagged,	  not	  removed,	  in	  order	  to	  create	  more	  positive	  outcomes	  overall.	  While	  it	  is understood	  that	  increased	  patent	  protection	  due	  to	  TRIPS	  favors	  established	  companies	  in	  developed	  nations	  due	  to	  increased	  patent	  protection,	  compulsory	  licenses	  may	  be	  the	  one	  area	  where	  developing	  nations	  won	  a	  victory	  during	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  agreement.	  Inclusion	  of	  compulsory	  licenses	  gave	  the	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developing	  nations	  a	  bargaining	  chip	  during	  discussions	  and	  negotiations	  with	  developed	  nations	  and	  their	  drug	  companies	  surrounding	  drug	  prices	  and	  drug	  access.	  Many	  authors	  also	  acknowledge	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  licenses	  for	  public	  health.	  Colleen	  Chien	  explains	  the	  rationale	  behind	  the	  inclusion	  of	  compulsory	  licenses,	  stating	  that	  “drugs	  are	  too	  important	  to	  patent	  and	  leave	  vulnerable	  to	  monopoly	  abuses”(Chien,	  2003).	  As	  much	  as	  compulsory	  licenses	  are	  deemed	  a	  necessary	  tool,	  the	  worry	  remains	  that	  given	  increased	  costs	  and	  risks	  associated	  with	  drug	  development,	  pharmaceuticals	  are	  especially	  at	  risk	  of	  compulsory	  license	  and	  that	  they	  may	  seriously	  hurt	  innovation.	  The	  primary	  benefit	  gained	  from	  the	  existence	  of	  compulsory	  licenses	  may	  not	  even	  be	  the	  licenses	  themselves.	  Rather,	  the	  threat	  of	  the	  licenses	  can	  incentivize	  companies	  to	  give	  voluntary	  reductions	  in	  price	  (called	  here	  a	  voluntary	  license).	  This	  compromise	  of	  a	  voluntary	  license	  allows	  drug	  companies	  to	  retain	  control	  over	  their	  intellectual	  property,	  which	  is	  paramount,	  while	  still	  allowing	  a	  reduction	  in	  price	  for	  the	  countries	  in	  need.	  Control	  of	  their	  own	  intellectual	  property	  allows	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  to	  better	  avoid	  misuse	  and	  abuse	  of	  their	  patent.	  With	  a	  voluntary	  license,	  a	  company	  can	  better	  control	  the	  flow	  of	  the	  drug,	  its	  use,	  its	  re-­‐export	  to	  other	  countries,	  its	  quality,	  etc.	  When	  a	  compulsory	  license	  is	  issued,	  the	  company	  loses	  control	  over	  all	  of	  these	  aspects,	  which	  is	  a	  bad	  outcome	  for	  the	  company.	  While	  the	  threat	  of	  the	  compulsory	  license	  is	  not	  needed	  when	  the	  company	  is	  willing	  to	  negotiate	  fully	  on	  matters	  of	  pricing,	  the	  threat	  is	  invaluable	  when	  dealing	  with	  companies	  who	  may	  be	  “initially	  unwilling	  to	  negotiate	  prices	  to	  a	  level	  that	  a	  country	  can	  afford”	  (Savoie,	  2007).	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   Understanding	  that	  a	  voluntary	  license	  is	  a	  more	  positive	  outcome	  for	  both	  parties,	  under	  most	  circumstances,	  countries	  are	  required	  to	  negotiate	  for	  a	  voluntary	  license	  prior	  to	  issuing	  a	  compulsory	  license.	  This	  means	  that,	  no	  matter	  how	  many	  compulsory	  licenses	  we	  actually	  see	  in	  the	  market,	  the	  impact	  that	  they	  have	  had	  is	  far	  greater.	  For	  example,	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license	  has	  been	  successfully	  used	  by	  Brazil	  to	  negotiate	  lower	  prices	  from	  multiple	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  (Feldman,	  2009).	  While	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  thesis	  discusses	  and	  deals	  with	  compulsory	  licenses,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  merely	  examining	  the	  licenses	  themselves	  does	  not	  capture	  a	  huge	  positive	  benefit	  from	  the	  threat	  of	  the	  licenses.	  	  Returning	  to	  compulsory	  licenses,	  Chien	  established	  that	  the	  effect	  that	  a	  compulsory	  license	  has	  on	  innovation	  and	  R&D	  expenditure	  could	  be	  explained	  by	  examining	  both	  predictability	  of	  the	  compulsory	  license	  and	  importance	  of	  the	  market	  in	  which	  the	  license	  was issued.	  Predictability	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  a	  company	  can	  anticipate	  the	  coming	  compulsory	  license.	  In	  1977,	  Scherer	  postulated	  that	  unpredictable	  compulsory	  licenses	  do	  not	  harm	  innovation	  (Scherer,	  1977).	  The	  rationale	  behind	  this	  argument	  is that	  if	  a	  compulsory	  license	  cannot	  be	  predicted,	  then	  it	  will	  not	  factor	  into	  a	  company’s	  analysis	  of	  potential	  returns	  when	  considering	  R&D	  programs.	  If,	  however,	  the	  licenses	  are	  predictable,	  companies	  may	  factor	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  license	  into	  the	  decision	  making	  process	  (Chien,	  2003).	  When	  Chien	  describes	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  compulsory	  license,	  she	  means	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  domestic	  market	  in	  which	  the	  compulsory	  license	  is issued.	  If	  a	  country,	  which	  normally	  contributes	  negligibly	  to	  the	  total	  revenue	  for	  a	  drug,	  issues	  a	  compulsory	  license,	  it	  has	  a	  completely	  different	  effect	  than	  if	  a	  country	  with	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  global	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market	  issues	  the	  license.	  In	  combination,	  if	  a	  country	  that	  is expected	  to	  have	  a	  very	  high	  percent	  of	  the	  global	  market	  is also	  very	  likely	  to	  issue	  a	  compulsory	  license,	  that	  will	  considerably	  change	  a	  company’s	  incentives	  to	  innovate,	  therefore	  fundamentally	  changing	  their	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  and	  maybe	  changing	  which	  projects	  they	  fund.	  While	  it	  would	  almost	  never	  happen,	  an	  example	  like	  this	  almost	  occurred	  when	  the	  United	  States	  threatened	  to	  issue	  a	  compulsory	  license	  for	  Ciprofloxacin	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  on	  September	  11th.	  	  Beyond	  the	  predictability	  and	  importance	  of	  the	  compulsory	  license	  to	  firms,	  we	  will	  be	  well	  served	  to	  discuss	  different	  disease	  types	  and	  how	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license	  may	  significantly	  change	  a	  company’s	  incentive	  to	  innovate.	  Leading	  NGOs	  and	  medical	  providers	  have	  categorized	  diseases	  into	  three	  main	  categories:	  type	  I,	  type	  II,	  and	  type	  III.	  Type	  I	  diseases	  are	  diseases	  where	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  market	  is in	  the	  developed	  world	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  developing	  world	  (diabetes),	  and	  the	  disease	  burden	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  is less	  than	  three	  times	  that	  of	  the	  developed	  world.	  A	  type	  II	  disease	  is a	  disease	  where	  the	  majority	  of	  individuals	  that	  have	  the	  disease	  live	  in	  the	  developing	  world,	  however	  some	  individuals	  in	  the	  developed	  world	  also	  contract	  the	  disease	  (Dengue).	  Type	  II	  diseases	  have	  between	  three	  and	  35	  times	  the	  disease	  burden	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  as	  the	  developed.	  Finally,	  a	  type	  III	  disease	  is a	  disease	  almost	  exclusively	  affecting	  the	  developing	  world	  and	  practically	  non-­‐existent	  in	  the	  developed	  world	  (Malaria).	  These	  diseases	  have	  a	  total	  burden	  between	  35	  and	  1000	  times	  larger	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  as	  the	  developed	  world	  (WHO,	  2012).	  Theorists	  predict	  and	  history	  shows	  that	  most	  compulsory	  licenses	  are	  issued	  by	  developing	  nations,	  which	  is	  an	  unsurprising	  result,	  
	   18	  
given	  that	  those	  nations	  have	  the	  least	  access	  to	  medications.	  Given	  all	  this	  background	  information,	  we	  can	  hypothesize	  the	  effect	  for	  each	  disease	  type.	  
III)	  Literature	  Review:	  
A)	  Predicting	  Impact	  While	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  license	  on	  the	  short-­‐term	  value	  of	  a	  firm	  has	  not	  been	  studied,	  other	  research	  has	  been	  done	  to	  assess	  other	  impacts	  of	  the	  license.	  First,	  trying	  to	  ascertain	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  license	  on	  drug	  sales	  has	  been	  theorized.	  Using	  the	  framework	  from	  above,	  if	  a	  drug	  for	  a	  type	  I	  disease	  gets	  a	  compulsory	  license	  issued	  by	  a	  developing	  nation,	  one	  can	  expect	  the	  overall	  revenue	  of	  the	  drug	  company	  who	  owns	  the	  drug	  to	  be	  unaffected	  because	  the	  revenue	  from	  the	  drug	  will	  be	  almost	  entirely	  in	  the	  developed	  world	  (Reichman,	  2009).	  Similarly,	  for	  a	  type	  II	  disease,	  although	  it	  may	  have	  a	  bit	  more	  of	  a	  deleterious	  effect	  on	  the	  financial	  outlook	  of	  the	  drug,	  the	  developing	  markets	  are	  still	  less	  critical	  than	  the	  developed	  markets.	  However,	  for	  type	  III	  diseases,	  where	  the	  revenue	  is coming	  almost	  exclusively	  from	  the	  developing	  world,	  the	  issuance	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license	  would, theoretically,	  have	  a	  significant	  deleterious	  effect	  on	  the	  outlook	  of	  drug	  sales	  worldwide	  (whether	  those	  drugs	  get	  made	  in	  the	  first	  place	  is	  a	  different	  discussion).	  
B)	  Who	  Issues	  Them:	  Adding	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  compulsory	  license	  issuance,	  Beall	  and	  Kuhn	  from	  University	  of	  Denver’s	  School	  of	  International	  Studies,	  decided	  to	  examine	  what	  types	  of	  countries	  were	  actually	  issuing	  the	  compulsory	  licenses	  for	  patented	  pharmaceuticals.	  They	  hypothesized	  that	  even	  when	  a	  compulsory	  license	  was issued,	  the	  lower	  income	  countries	  (LIC)	  would	  lack	  the	  production	  capability,	  distribution	  networks,	  and	  buying	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power	  to	  efficiently	  and	  effectively	  utilize	  the	  compulsory	  license	  (Beall	  &	  Kuhn,	  2012).	  By	  combing	  through	  as	  many	  databases	  as	  possible,	  they	  found	  13	  issued	  compulsory	  licenses	  to	  examine	  in	  their	  analysis.	  They	  found	  that	  there	  were	  more	  compulsory	  license	  issued	  by	  upper	  middle-­‐income	  countries	  (UMIC)	  than	  LICs.	  	  This	  result	  highlights	  potential	  inefficiencies	  in	  the	  compulsory	  license	  system	  due	  to	  their	  underutilization	  by	  LICs.	  It	  stands	  to	  reason	  that	  the	  countries	  that	  could	  benefit	  most	  are	  the	  countries	  that	  have	  the	  lowest	  levels	  of	  health	  and	  health	  care	  (LICs).	  However,	  the	  smaller	  number	  of	  licenses	  issued	  in	  LICs	  indicates	  that,	  although	  they	  need	  the	  compulsory	  licenses	  the	  most,	  they	  are	  not	  issuing	  them.	  The	  authors	  speculate	  that	  this	  has	  to	  do	  with	  issues	  of	  production.	  Even	  though	  most	  of	  the	  licenses	  examined	  came	  after	  TRIPS	  article	  31bis	  that	  allowed	  for	  import	  of	  compulsory	  licensed	  drugs,	  the	  lack	  of	  LIC	  countries	  means	  compulsory	  licenses	  are	  not	  being	  utilized	  to	  their	  full	  potential.	  	  
C)	  Incentives	  to	  Innovate:	  Whether	  compulsory	  licenses	  change	  or	  harm	  incentives	  to	  innovate	  has	  also	  been	  studied.	  Colleen	  Chien	  looked	  at	  six	  cases	  of	  compulsory	  license	  in	  her	  analysis,	  four	  of	  which	  she	  describes	  as	  “sporadic,”	  while	  the	  other	  two	  were	  the	  result	  of	  a	  merger,	  which	  makes	  them	  irrelevant	  to	  this	  thesis.	  Calling	  them	  sporadic	  means	  that	  they	  could	  not	  be	  predicted	  at	  all	  (harkening	  back	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  predictability).	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  four	  licenses	  that	  she	  deemed	  sporadic	  did	  not	  cause	  a	  drop	  in	  R&D	  expenditure	  in	  the	  therapeutic	  area	  of	  the	  license.	  Chien	  echoes	  the	  argument	  highlighting	  the	  difference	  between	  compulsory	  licenses	  issued	  for	  a	  global	  disease	  versus	  a	  developing	  world	  disease.	  Even	  though	  Chien	  does	  not	  find	  a	  statistically	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significant	  result	  in	  her	  analysis,	  she	  does	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  disincentives	  to	  innovate	  may	  not	  be	  captured	  in	  the	  analysis	  if	  research	  was	  never	  undertaken	  to	  begin	  with	  (Chien,	  2003).	  While	  this	  underscores	  why	  compulsory	  licenses	  may	  do	  more	  harm	  to	  developing	  nations	  than	  can	  be	  quantified,	  this	  does	  not	  capture	  the	  entire	  picture,	  since	  they	  may	  bring	  additional	  bargaining	  power.	  Overall,	  an	  unclear	  picture	  may	  arise	  of	  compulsory	  licenses	  in	  which	  the	  true	  benefits	  and	  costs	  of	  the	  licenses	  are	  unknown.	  	  
D)	  FDI	  Impact:	  The	  issuance	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license	  by	  a	  developing	  nation	  may	  also	  come	  with	  other	  negative	  consequences	  like	  divestment	  by	  large	  multinational	  pharmaceutical	  companies.	  This	  can	  be	  assessed	  by	  the	  change	  in	  total	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  (FDI)	  into	  a	  country.	  FDI	  is	  the	  flow	  of	  people,	  capital,	  and	  technology	  from	  one	  country	  to	  another.	  In	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry,	  FDI	  is usually	  the	  acquisition	  or	  production	  of	  subsidiaries	  in	  the	  host	  country(R.	  C.	  C.	  Bird,	  Daniel	  R.	  ,	  2008).	  FDI	  has	  been	  used	  in	  the	  past	  as	  a	  metric	  to	  judge	  confidence	  in	  the	  host	  nation.	  A	  significant	  portion	  of	  pharmaceutical	  companies’	  worry	  comes	  about	  due	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  compulsory	  license	  mishandling	  and	  very	  high	  transaction	  costs	  for	  both	  companies	  and	  nations.	  If	  a	  country	  is likely	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  compulsory	  license,	  it	  may	  be	  in	  the	  multinational	  firm’s	  best	  interest	  to	  avoid	  ventures	  into	  that	  country	  and	  seek	  a	  more	  friendly	  business	  environment	  rather	  than	  deal	  with	  the	  constant	  threat	  of	  a	  license	  and	  the	  high	  legal	  costs	  if	  they	  do	  come	  to	  fruition	  (Bird,	  2009).	  Additionally,	  manufacturers	  tasked	  with	  production	  of	  the	  compulsory	  licensed	  drug	  may	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  license	  and	  attempt	  to	  generate	  profit	  rather	  than	  alleviate	  the	  epidemic	  through	  low	  cost	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medication.	  For	  example,	  the	  Washington	  Post	  in	  2002	  reported	  that	  “Nearly	  $18	  million	  worth	  of	  reduced-­‐price	  HIV	  drugs	  intended	  for	  impoverished	  Africans	  have	  been	  intercepted	  by	  profiteers	  and	  shipped	  back	  to	  Europe	  to	  be	  sold	  at	  marked-­‐up	  price”	  (HST,	  2002).	  While	  this	  number	  is	  not	  large	  for	  the	  bottom	  line	  of	  a	  pharmaceutical	  company,	  parallel	  imports	  /	  arbitrages	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  eat	  away	  significantly	  at	  the	  earnings	  potential	  of	  a	  drug	  and	  also	  harm	  the	  intended	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  drug.	  Due	  to	  parallel	  imports,	  there	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  extreme	  negative	  consequences	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license	  for	  the	  multinational	  entities	  (MNEs)	  profits	  even	  if	  the	  issuing	  nation	  is	  a	  negligible	  market,	  especially	  since	  the	  company	  itself	  cannot	  control	  the	  distribution	  during	  a	  compulsory	  license.	  Egypt	  is an	  example	  of	  what	  can	  happen	  when	  a	  country	  seemingly	  oversteps	  their	  bounds	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  compulsory	  license	  and	  then	  suffers	  significant	  negative	  consequences.	  Egypt	  has,	  historically,	  been	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  use	  of	  compulsory	  licensing	  for	  drugs,	  although	  perhaps	  for	  questionable	  reasons	  (Aziz,	  2003).	  It	  has	  cited	  reasons	  including	  that	  the	  current	  price	  of	  the	  drug	  is	  too	  high,	  and	  it	  does	  not	  meet	  demand.	  As	  unfortunate	  as	  this	  may	  be,	  the	  drug	  price	  being	  too	  high	  for	  a	  non-­‐essential	  medication	  is	  not	  in	  itself	  enough	  to	  warrant	  the	  issuance	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license	  under	  the	  Doha	  declaration.	  Egypt’s	  issuance	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license	  on	  Viagra	  in	  2002	  illustrates	  this	  perfectly.	  While	  some	  may	  argue	  this	  medication	  is	  of	  the	  utmost	  importance,	  it	  is difficult	  to	  believe	  that	  Egypt	  was	  suffering	  so	  severely,	  or	  so	  much	  worse	  than	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  as	  to	  warrant	  considering	  it	  a	  public	  health	  issue.	  Although	  “local	  pharmaceutical	  manufacturers	  [accused]	  the	  Egyptian	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  of	  exploiting	  Egypt’s	  poor	  by	  granting	  Pfizer	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  sell	  Viagra	  within	  Egypt’s	  
	   22	  
borders,”	  that	  is	  not	  enough	  reason	  to	  grant	  a	  compulsory	  license	  (R.	  C.	  Bird,	  2009).	  The	  issuance	  of	  the	  license	  exemplifies	  the	  potential	  misuse	  of	  the	  compulsory	  license	  system.	  This	  license	  was	  granted	  because	  of	  political	  pressure	  applied	  by	  small	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  within	  Egypt,	  not	  by	  individuals	  looking	  out	  for	  the	  public	  health	  of	  Egyptian	  citizens.	  Additionally,	  the	  argument	  made	  for	  the	  compulsory	  license	  was	  a	  financial	  one,	  and	  not	  an	  essential	  medicine	  one,	  which	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  reason	  for	  a	  compulsory	  license	  under	  TRIPS	  and	  the	  Doha	  Declaration.	  	  Multinational	  corporations	  met	  the	  issuance	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license	  by	  Egypt	  first	  with	  harsh	  criticism,	  then	  with	  action.	  Their	  action	  was	  catalyzed	  by	  their	  lack	  of	  faith	  in	  Egypt’s	  intellectual	  property	  laws.	  This	  was	  highlighted	  when	  Egyptian	  representatives	  to	  pharmaceuticals	  were informed	  that	  their	  weak	  patent	  landscape	  had	  cost	  them	  over	  $300	  million	  of	  investment	  into	  their	  pharmaceutical	  sector	  (Aziz,	  2003).	  While	  the	  Viagra	  license	  exemplifies	  the	  potential	  for	  abuse,	  the	  weak	  patent	  landscape	  had	  already	  been	  hurting	  Egypt’s	  economy	  significantly.	  The	  amount	  of	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  into	  Egypt	  declined	  from	  about	  $950	  million	  dollars	  in	  1987	  to	  $425	  million	  in	  2002	  (R.	  C.	  C.	  Bird,	  Daniel	  R.	  ,	  2008).	  While	  the	  authors’	  conclusion	  does	  seem	  a	  little	  ambitious	  and	  one-­‐dimensional	  given	  Egypt’s	  tumultuous	  political	  scene,	  it	  is clear	  that	  when	  used	  and	  misused,	  the	  issuance	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license	  can	  have	  strong	  negative	  consequences	  on	  the	  non-­‐generic	  pharmaceutical	  sector	  of	  a	  nation.	  	  While	  Egypt	  is a	  good	  example	  of	  the	  potential	  impacts	  of	  compulsory	  license	  misuse	  on	  foreign	  direct	  investment,	  other	  nations	  have	  dealt	  with	  similar	  issues	  as	  well.	  In	  the	  time	  immediately	  following	  TRIPS,	  the	  Argentine	  Senate	  forced	  through	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legislation	  which	  enacted	  patent	  law	  inconsistent	  with	  TRIPS,	  causing	  a	  reduction	  in	  trust	  from	  MNE’s	  (R.	  C.	  Bird,	  2009).	  For	  example,	  upon	  filing	  an	  appeal	  against	  a	  compulsory	  license,	  the	  license	  would	  not	  be	  suspended	  immediately.	  Rather,	  the	  patent	  office	  would	  wait	  for	  the	  ruling	  of	  the	  court	  (R.	  C.	  Bird,	  2009)	  to	  require	  the	  suspension	  of	  the	  license.	  This	  allowed	  for	  imitation	  to	  occur	  easier,	  causing	  serious	  revenue	  loss	  for	  MNE’s.	  In	  the	  period	  after	  this	  new	  Argentine	  legislation,	  countries	  such	  as	  Germany	  and	  Sweden	  actively	  voiced	  concern	  and	  stated	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  IPR	  was	  the	  central	  concern	  of	  business	  owners	  considering	  entering	  into	  Argentina	  (R.	  C.	  Bird,	  2009).	  	  	  Overall,	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  the	  issuance	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  cause	  severe	  negative	  consequences	  to	  the	  issuing	  nation.	  There	  is not	  much	  information	  about	  how	  the	  license	  affects	  the	  value	  of	  the	  company	  that	  the	  license	  was issued	  against.	  I	  will	  address	  this	  by	  examining	  how	  the	  value	  of	  a	  firm	  does	  or	  does	  not	  change	  after	  the	  announcement	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license.	  	  
E)	  Event	  Studies:	  In	  order	  to	  ascertain	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  license,	  I	  employ	  an	  event	  study	  methodology	  in	  this	  thesis.	  The	  goal	  of	  any	  event	  study	  is	  to	  calculate	  and	  test	  the	  impact	  of	  specific	  value	  changing	  moments	  on	  a	  firm’s	  stock	  price	  by	  calculating	  the	  expected	  return	  over	  a	  period	  and	  comparing	  it	  to	  actual	  return.	  In	  modern	  corporate	  finance,	  event	  studies	  are	  used	  to	  study	  the	  effect	  of	  events	  such	  as	  dividend	  announcements,	  earnings,	  mergers,	  capital	  expenditures,	  and	  new	  issues	  of	  stocks	  (Ross,	  2010).	  Because	  compulsory	  license	  announcements	  often	  come	  as	  a	  surprise	  
	   24	  
announcement,	  this	  event	  study	  methodology	  is	  perfectly	  suited	  for	  the	  needs	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  Sporadically	  used	  since	  the	  1930’s,	  event	  studies	  entered	  the	  main	  stream	  in	  the	  1960’s,	  with	  two	  seminal	  papers	  by	  Ball	  and	  Brown	  (1968)	  and	  Fama	  et	  al.	  (1969)	  (Corrado,	  2011).	  	  In	  fact,	  well	  over	  500	  papers	  using	  the	  event	  study	  methodology	  have	  been	  published	  between	  1974	  and	  2000	  in	  5	  of	  the	  large	  economics	  journals	  (Kothari,	  2004).	  This	  number	  shows	  the	  wide	  use	  and	  acceptance	  of	  event	  studies	  as	  a	  viable	  methodology.	  In	  pharmaceuticals	  more	  specifically,	  extensive	  research	  has	  been	  done	  with	  event	  studies.	  They	  have	  been	  used	  to	  answer	  questions	  in	  the	  pharmaceutical	  space	  such	  as	  long	  term	  value	  creation	  (Tomovic,	  2012),	  the	  value	  of	  alliances	  and	  joint	  ventures	  (Campart,	  2007),	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  transforming	  domestic	  patent	  systems	  from	  process	  to	  product	  patents	  (Kawaura	  &	  La	  Croix,	  1995).	  While	  the	  event	  study	  has	  been	  employed	  to	  answer	  many	  questions	  in	  the	  pharmaceutical	  space,	  it	  has	  never	  been	  used	  before	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  posed	  in	  this	  thesis:	  what	  is	  the	  short-­‐term	  impact	  on	  firm	  value	  of	  the	  announcement	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license?	  Before	  employing	  an	  event	  study,	  however,	  it	  is	  first	  necessary	  to	  specify	  which	  country	  to	  take	  data	  from,	  which	  model	  to	  use,	  the	  length	  of	  time	  to	  study,	  and	  which	  tests	  to	  run.	  	  Rather	  than	  an	  event	  study	  methodology,	  I	  could	  have	  used	  the	  difference-­‐in-­‐differences	  (DID)	  methodology.	  This	  also	  looks	  at	  the	  change	  in	  a	  treatment	  group	  versus	  a	  control	  group.	  This	  is	  also	  an	  extremely	  common	  framework,	  which	  would	  have	  worked	  for	  this	  analysis.	  However,	  these	  two	  methodologies	  are	  so	  close,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  expected	  change	  for	  the	  stock	  price	  should	  be	  reflected	  quickly	  versus	  for	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looking	  for	  impact	  over	  time,	  means	  that	  the	  event	  study	  is	  as	  well,	  if	  not	  better,	  suited	  for	  this	  research	  than	  a	  DID	  analysis.	  	  
F)	  Choosing	  the	  Reference	  Country:	  	   Before	  gathering	  data,	  I	  first	  had	  to	  decide	  which	  market’s	  data	  to	  use,	  since	  many	  of	  the	  licenses	  were	  occurring	  in	  developing	  nations.	  Obviously,	  if	  the	  license	  issued	  was	  in	  a	  country	  without	  a	  stock	  exchange,	  it	  was	  easy	  to	  justify	  using	  the	  data	  from	  the	  US	  as	  a	  proxy.	  However,	  it	  was	  not	  as	  clear	  a	  decision	  when	  dealing	  with	  larger	  countries	  such	  as	  Brazil.	  In	  event	  study	  research	  involving	  multinational	  corporations	  or	  subsidiaries,	  the	  market	  used	  is	  chosen	  in	  one	  of	  three	  ways	  (Gu	  &	  Reed,	  2013).	  First,	  you	  can	  use	  the	  firm’s	  home	  market.	  Second,	  you	  can	  use	  the	  market	  with	  the	  highest	  volume.	  Finally,	  you	  can	  use	  the	  US	  as	  a	  proxy.	  In	  the	  end,	  using	  Gu	  &	  Reed’s	  rationale,	  the	  US	  was	  chosen	  for	  analysis	  since	  the	  US	  satisfies	  two	  if	  not	  all	  three	  of	  those	  criteria	  set	  out	  in	  their	  paper.	  In	  the	  end,	  no	  matter	  where	  the	  license	  was	  issued,	  data	  from	  the	  NYSE	  or	  NASDAQ	  was	  used.	  
G)	  Return	  Generating	  Models:	  	  In	  order	  to	  successfully	  complete	  an	  event	  study,	  one	  needs	  an	  accurate	  way	  to	  model	  expected	  performance	  of	  a	  stock	  during	  the	  period	  following	  the	  compulsory	  license	  (called	  the	  event	  window).	  While	  some	  may	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  the	  wrong	  period	  to	  study,	  and	  the	  compulsory	  license	  effect	  would	  be	  noticed	  more	  when	  earnings	  are	  released,	  there	  are	  far	  more	  pieces	  of	  information	  being	  learned	  during	  an	  earnings	  announcement,	  thereby	  diluting	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  license.	  So,	  the	  event	  window	  with	  the	  period	  including	  the	  announcement	  better	  reflects	  the	  impact	  of	  just	  the	  license.	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  In	  order	  to	  calculate	  the	  expected	  return	  of	  a	  stock	  over	  a	  given	  period,	  we	  create	  a	  model	  of	  the	  stock’s	  performance	  in	  the	  previous	  time	  frame	  to	  help	  us	  estimate.	  This	  model	  is	  called	  a	  return-­‐generating	  model	  and	  is	  critical	  to	  the	  event	  study.	  	  The	  three	  accepted	  forms	  of	  the	  return	  generating	  model	  are	  the	  market-­‐adjusted	  return	  model,	  the	  mean-­‐adjusted	  return	  model,	  and	  the	  risk	  adjusted	  return	  model	  (Fernando,	  11/25/2009).	  The	  market-­‐adjusted	  return	  model	  is	  the	  crudest	  estimation	  model,	  stating	  that	  the	  expected	  return	  of	  the	  security	  during	  the	  event	  window	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  market	  return	  on	  that	  day.	  This	  essentially	  states	  that	  every	  stock	  has	  an	  expected	  return	  on	  day	  t	  equal	  to	  the	  market	  on	  day	  t	  and	  that	  the	  firm	  has	  absolutely	  no	  impact	  at	  all.	  See	  equation	  below:	  𝐸(𝑅!") = 𝛽!𝑅!"	  Where	  𝐸(𝑅!")	  is	  the	  expected	  return	  of	  firm	  i	  on	  day	  t,	  Rmt	  is	  the	  return	  of	  the	  market	  on	  day	  t,	  and	  𝛽!   	  is	  modifier	  to	  relate	  the	  two.	  This	  equation	  is	  even	  more	  constrained	  than	  it	  first	  appears,	  since	  this	  model	  forces	  𝛽!   value	  to	  be	  equal	  to	  one.	  While	  this	  leads	  to	  a	  simple	  analysis,	  it	  seems	  oversimplifying	  and	  removes	  any	  information	  about	  the	  past	  performance	  of	  the	  firm	  from	  the	  analysis.	  In	  pilot	  simulations	  and	  practice,	  this	  may	  lead	  to	  “somewhat	  inflated	  [effect]	  compared	  with	  the	  other	  two	  models”	  (Fernando,	  11/25/2009).	  	  Fernando’s	  comment	  translates	  to	  a	  high	  potential	  for	  a	  type	  I	  error.	  A	  type	  I	  error	  is,	  in	  simple	  terms,	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  false	  positive,	  which	  should	  be	  avoided	  if	  possible.	  So,	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  a	  false	  rejection	  of	  the	  null	  hypothesis,	  the	  market-­‐adjusted	  model	  is	  not	  used.	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Compared	  with	  the	  market-­‐adjusted	  return	  model,	  the	  mean	  adjusted	  return	  model	  does	  attempt	  to	  make	  the	  analysis	  more	  directed,	  however	  it	  still	  does	  not	  quite	  have	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  risk-­‐adjusted	  return	  model.	  In	  the	  mean-­‐adjusted	  model,	  the	  expected	  performance	  of	  the	  company	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  average	  performance	  of	  the	  company	  in	  the	  window	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  event	  (the	  event	  window),	  shown	  the	  in	  the	  equation	  below:	   𝐸(𝑅!") = 𝛼! 	  Here	  the	  𝛼! 	  is	  a	  constant	  equal	  to	  the	  average	  daily	  return	  of	  the	  stock	  during	  the	  estimation	  window.	  	  While	  this	  model	  does	  account	  for	  the	  firm’s	  performance	  in	  the	  period	  leading	  up,	  it	  does	  not	  account	  for	  the	  market’s	  effect	  on	  firm	  performance	  at	  all.	  Just	  as	  the	  market-­‐adjusted	  return	  model	  was	  incomplete	  for	  not	  including	  any	  firm	  performance	  information,	  we	  can	  describe	  this	  model	  as	  incomplete	  for	  not	  including	  any	  information	  about	  market	  performance.	  This	  would	  leave	  the	  analysis	  open	  to	  huge	  gaps.	  Imagine	  if,	  halfway	  through	  the	  event	  window,	  there	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  an	  economic	  downturn.	  That	  would	  not	  be	  captured	  when	  examining	  purely	  company	  data	  and	  would	  lead	  to	  incomplete	  analysis.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  market-­‐adjusted	  return	  model	  was	  not	  chosen	  for	  this	  study.	  	   Finally,	  the	  risk-­‐adjusted	  return	  model	  accounts	  for	  both	  the	  previous	  company	  performance	  and	  the	  market	  performance,	  remedying	  the	  issues	  discussed	  earlier.	  Using	  the	  equation	  	   𝐸(𝑅!") = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑅!"	  where	  Rit	  is	  the	  firm’s	  performance	  and	  Rmt	  is	  the	  market	  performance,	  we	  can	  estimate	  an	  α	  and	  a	  β,	  which	  are	  the	  slope	  and	  intercept	  of	  the	  line	  we	  are	  predicting,	  for	  the	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period	  prior	  to	  the	  license.	  This	  allows	  me	  to	  calculate	  an	  expected	  performance	  given	  what	  happens	  in	  the	  market	  in	  the	  event	  window.	  Additionally,	  this	  model	  is	  preferable	  because	  it	  results	  in	  smaller	  variances	  of	  abnormal	  returns	  (Strong,	  1992).	  In	  the	  end	  this	  model	  was	  chosen	  since,	  of	  the	  three	  models	  shown	  above,	  this	  is	  the	  most	  accurate	  since	  it	  accounts	  for	  the	  market	  and	  the	  firm,	  not	  just	  one	  or	  the	  other.	  
H)	  Length	  of	  Event	  Window:	  The	  event	  window,	  as	  discussed	  previously,	  is	  the	  period	  immediately	  following	  the	  event	  (in	  this	  case	  the	  compulsory	  license).	  Some	  research	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  length	  of	  time	  best	  suited	  for	  an	  event	  window.	  In	  some	  cases,	  long	  event	  windows	  of	  over	  a	  year	  are	  required.	  However,	  those	  have	  a	  surfeit	  of	  problems	  which	  arise,	  such	  as	  other	  events	  causing	  shocks,	  different	  market	  outlooks,	  etc	  (Kothari,	  2004).	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  a	  long	  event	  window	  would	  be	  entirely	  unnecessary.	  	  I	  assume	  in	  this	  research	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  days	  or	  weeks	  following	  the	  issuance	  of	  the	  license.	  In	  a	  similarly	  designed	  study	  focusing	  on	  the	  analysis	  of	  pharmaceutical	  alliances	  and	  joint	  ventures	  on	  stock	  price,	  a	  21	  day	  period	  was	  used	  as	  the	  event	  window	  (which,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  this	  analysis,	  means	  15	  trading	  days)	  (Campart,	  2007).	  Additionally,	  within	  the	  paper	  it	  is	  noted	  that,	  while	  three	  weeks	  was	  used	  “an	  event	  window	  of	  3	  days	  would	  suffice	  here,	  for	  all	  the	  reaction	  of	  the	  investors	  is	  concentrated	  with	  these	  3	  days”	  (Campart,	  2007).	  However,	  it	  struck	  me	  that	  many	  of	  these	  announcements	  may	  be	  made	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day.	  So,	  in	  order	  to	  account	  for	  this	  possibility,	  one	  day	  was	  added	  to	  the	  event	  windows	  for	  both	  the	  three	  and	  fifteen	  trading	  day	  windows.	  Given	  all	  of	  this	  input,	  event	  windows	  of	  four	  days	  and	  sixteen	  days	  were	  both	  chosen,	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  compulsory	  licenses.	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I)	  Statistical	  Tests:	  	  	  	   Finally,	  after	  calculating	  the	  cumulative	  abnormal	  return	  (CAR),	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  establish	  which	  statistical	  tests	  to	  use.	  Making	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  CARs	  are	  normally	  distributed,	  first	  the	  data	  will	  be	  run	  with	  a	  parametric	  t	  test.	  Many	  authors,	  such	  as	  Fernando,	  employ	  the	  t-­‐test	  to	  test	  significance	  across	  all	  samples.	  Some	  authors	  have	  argued	  for	  and	  concluded	  that,	  even	  if	  a	  dataset	  is	  non-­‐normally	  distributed,	  the	  t	  -­‐test	  is	  still	  an	  appropriate	  test	  (Dyckman,	  Philbrick,	  &	  Stephan,	  1984).	  However,	  not	  all	  share	  their	  belief.	  Since	  our	  data	  is	  across	  multiple	  time	  periods,	  companies,	  and	  diseases,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  data	  is	  normally	  distributed	  so	  the	  Wilcoxon-­‐signed	  rank	  test	  is	  also	  utilized.	  Serving	  as	  a	  non-­‐parametric	  alternative	  to	  the	  t	  -­‐test	  for	  event	  studies,	  the	  Wilcoxon	  is	  often	  used	  in	  tandem	  with	  a	  normal	  student	  t	  -­‐test	  (Tomovic,	  2012),	  (Akbar,	  2010).	  	  The	  Wilcoxon	  test	  assesse	  whether	  two	  sets	  of	  data	  are	  statistically	  different.	  Here,	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  data	  are	  the	  calculated	  t	  -­‐stats	  for	  each	  example	  and	  zero.	  The	  null	  hypothesis	  for	  the	  Wilcoxon	  test	  is	  that	  the	  median	  difference	  between	  the	  pairs	  of	  values	  is	  zero.	  If	  we	  fail	  to	  reject	  that	  hypothesis,	  then	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  say	  that	  the	  two	  data	  sets	  are	  different,	  meaning	  that	  the	  calculated	  t	  -­‐stats	  are	  not	  different	  from	  zero.	  Ranking	  absolute	  values	  of	  the	  t-­‐stats	  from	  largest	  to	  smallest,	  the	  test	  then	  assesses	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  in	  the	  two	  data	  sets.	  Since	  the	  use	  of	  these	  tests	  in	  tandem	  is	  both	  common	  and	  standard	  practice,	  this	  thesis	  also	  employs	  the	  use	  of	  these	  two	  tests.	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IV)	  Methods:	  Event	  studies	  calculate	  the	  “abnormal	  return”	  for	  a	  stock	  on	  a	  given	  day	  and	  test	  whether	  this	  abnormal	  return	  is	  statistically	  different	  from	  the	  expected	  return	  for	  the	  day	  given	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  market.	  In	  order	  to	  successfully	  calculate	  this,	  the	  following	  equation	  is	  used:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  𝐴𝑅!" = 𝑅!" − 𝐸 𝑅!" 𝑅!" 	   	   	   	   (1)	  Where	  𝐴𝑅!!	  is	  the	  abnormal	  return	  for	  firm	  i	  on	  the	  event	  day,	  𝑅!"	  is	  the	  return	  for	  firm	  i	  on	  the	  day	  t	  of	  the	  event	  window,	  and	  𝐸 𝑅!" 𝑅!" 	  is	  the	  expected	  return	  of	  firm	  i	  given	  the	  market	  return	  for	  day	  t.	  	  In	  order	  to	  calculate	  the	  𝐸 𝑅!" 𝑅!" 	  term,	  we	  must	  first	  establish	  how	  the	  firm’s	  stock	  fares	  compared	  with	  the	  market.	  We	  do	  this	  by	  examining	  the	  time	  before	  the	  event,	  called	  the	  estimation	  window.	  Using	  the	  risk-­‐adjusted	  market	  model,	  the	  following	  regression	  is	  used:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  𝑅!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑅!" + 𝜀!"	   	   	   	   (2)	  Using	  this	  regression	  with	  each	  firm’s	  returns	  in	  the	  days	  preceding	  the	  event	  and	  the	  market	  return	  allows	  the	  calculation	  of	  the	  𝐸 𝑅!" 𝑅!" 	  term	  with	  only	  the	  market	  return	  for	  day	  t.	  Combining	  equations	  (1)	  and	  (2),	  we	  can	  rewrite	  the	  equation	  for	  abnormal	  returns	  as:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  𝐴𝑅!" = 𝑅!" − 𝛼! − 𝛽!𝑅!"	   	   	   	   (3)	  Therefore,	  now	  that	  we	  have	  established	  how	  to	  calculate	  the	  abnormal	  return	  for	  day	  t,	  the	  normal	  distribution	  will	  appear	  as	  follows:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  𝐴𝑅!"~𝑁(0,𝜎! 𝐴𝑅!" )	   	   	   	   (4)	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Before	  going	  further,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  examine	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  abnormal	  return	  for	  the	  normal	  distribution.	  From	  Mackinlay’s	  review	  of	  event	  studies	  (MacKinlay,	  1997),	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  abnormal	  return	  is	  written	  as:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  𝜎! 𝐴𝑅!" = 𝜎!!"! +    !!! 1+ (!!"!!!)!!!! 	   	   	   (5)	  Where	  L1	  is	  the	  length,	  in	  days,	  of	  the	  estimation	  window,	  and	  𝜎!! 	  is	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  market.	  However,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  estimation	  window	  is	  sufficiently	  large,	  the	   !!!	  term	  will	  cause	  the	  entire	  second	  term	  to	  vanish.	  For	  this	  paper,	  a	  150	  day	  estimation	  window	  will	  be	  utilized	  (so	  L1	  =	  150),	  as	  that	  has	  previously	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  more	  than	  sufficient	  (MacKinlay,	  1997).	  That	  therefore	  reduces	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  abnormal	  return	  to	  just	  the	  𝜎! 𝐴𝑅!" = 𝜎!!"! ,	  which	  is	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  error	  term	   	  𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝜀!" = 𝜎!!"! 	  which	  we	  saw	  in	  equation	  (2).	  Using	  the	  abnormal	  return	  for	  a	  single	  day	  does	  not	  provide	  enough	  information	  to	  be	  able	  to	  assess	  the	  abnormal	  returns	  associated	  with	  a	  single	  event.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  the	  length	  of	  the	  event	  window	  was	  rationalized	  both	  by	  the	  standard	  practice	  (15	  days	  post	  event)	  and	  by	  the	  assessment	  Campart	  et	  al.	  had	  of	  their	  own	  data	  which	  helped	  me	  conclude	  that	  a	  four-­‐day	  event	  window	  post	  event	  was	  sufficient.	  This	  requires	  the	  abnormal	  returns	  be	  transformed	  into	  a	  cumulative	  abnormal	  return,	  denoted	  as	  CAR:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  𝐶𝐴𝑅! 𝜏!, 𝜏! = 𝐴𝑅!"!!!!!! 	   	   	   	   (6)	  Where	  𝜏!	  is	  the	  first	  day	  of	  the	  event	  window	  and	  𝜏!	  is	  the	  final	  date	  of	  the	  event	  window.	  Similarly	  to	  the	  single	  day	  abnormal	  return	  variance,	  for	  large	  estimation	  period	  the	  variance	  is:	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  𝜎!! 𝜏!, 𝜏! = 𝜏! − 𝜏! + 1   𝜎!!! 	   	   	   	   (7)	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	  use  𝜏! − 𝜏! + 1	  since	  𝜏!	  is	  equal	  to	  zero.	  If	  we	  did	  not	  add	  1	  then	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  CAR	  would	  be	  underestimated.	  With	  equations	  (6)	  and	  (7),	  we	  can	  therefore	  state	  that	  the	  normal	  distribution	  for	  the	  cumulative	  abnormal	  returns	  is	  as	  follows:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  𝐶𝐴𝑅!(𝜏!, 𝜏!)~𝑁(0,𝜎! 𝜏!, 𝜏! )	   	   	   	   (8)	  Given	  a	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  compulsory	  licenses	  do	  not	  significantly	  affect	  the	  stock	  price,	  we	  can	  use	  the	  above	  equation	  to	  test	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  assuming	  the	  distribution	  is	  normal.	  	  Additionally,	  since	  we	  do	  not	  have	  any	  prior	  notions	  on	  what,	  if	  any,	  effect	  the	  license	  will	  have,	  we	  will	  utilize	  a	  two-­‐tailed	  test.	  Stated	  explicitly,	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  there	  will	  be	  no	  significant	  effect	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license	  on	  company	  stock	  price	  or	  trading	  volume.	  
V)	  Data:	  Using	  the	  event	  study	  methodology	  outlined	  above,	  and	  the	  recommendations	  outlined	  as	  well,	  the	  data	  requirements	  are	  clear.	  First,	  in	  order	  to	  sufficiently	  calculate	  the	  firm	  return	  given	  the	  market	  return	  during	  the	  event	  window,	  150	  days	  of	  estimation	  window	  data	  is	  required.	  For	  this,	  the	  firm	  in	  question,	  along	  with	  a	  large	  stock	  index	  (the	  S&P	  500),	  and	  an	  index	  with	  a	  pharmaceutical	  focus	  (the	  NYSE	  ARCA	  Pharmaceutical	  Index)	  are	  required.	  Regressions	  will	  be	  run	  comparing	  both	  the	  cumulative	  abnormal	  returns	  compared	  to	  the	  S&P,	  and	  compared	  to	  the	  pharmaceutical	  index.	  For	  the	  event	  window,	  sixteen	  days	  of	  data	  are	  required.	  Once	  again,	  that	  data	  will	  be	  of	  the	  company	  in	  question,	  the	  S&P	  500,	  and	  the	  pharmaceutical	  index	  described	  above.	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Additionally,	  I	  also	  decided	  to	  gather	  the	  volume	  data	  for	  both	  the	  firms	  and	  the	  S&P	  index.	  Using	  this	  information,	  an	  additional	  test	  with	  event	  study	  methodology	  can	  be	  run	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  there	  was	  a	  statistically	  significant	  trading	  volume	  difference	  caused	  by	  the	  event.	  Similarly	  to	  the	  stock	  price	  analysis,	  this	  will	  also	  be	  a	  two-­‐tailed	  test.	  	  To	  ascertain	  the	  dates	  of	  the	  licenses,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  draw	  on	  multiple	  sources.	  While	  Beall	  and	  Kuhn	  found	  13	  verified	  compulsory	  licenses	  in	  11	  nations	  (Beall	  &	  Kuhn,	  2012),	  other	  sources	  have	  stated	  much	  higher	  numbers	  of	  compulsory	  licenses.	  For	  this	  analysis,	  news	  outlets	  such	  as	  the	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  were	  scoured	  and	  search	  engines	  used	  to	  verify	  Beall	  and	  Kuhn’s	  information	  and	  ascertain	  exact	  dates	  of	  those	  licenses,	  and	  others	  as	  well.	  In	  the	  end,	  data	  for	  24	  companies	  was	  gathered.	  Although	  more	  compulsory	  licenses	  have	  been	  issued,	  the	  firm	  was	  either	  private	  (Boehringer	  Ingelheim)	  or	  was	  not	  listed	  on	  the	  NYSE	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  license	  (Roche).	  	  
VI)	  Results:	  	   First,	  each	  compulsory	  license	  episode	  was	  tested	  for	  significance	  using	  the	  methods	  shown	  above.	  Each	  company	  stock	  price	  was	  tested	  in	  six	  ways.	  First,	  using	  a	  four-­‐day	  event	  window,	  the	  firm’s	  stock	  price	  return	  was	  tested	  against	  the	  pharmaceutical	  index	  return	  (drg),	  the	  S&P	  index	  market	  price	  return	  (SP),	  and	  finally	  against	  the	  S&P	  market	  volume	  (SP_V).	  Then,	  the	  same	  regressions	  were	  run,	  but	  instead	  of	  an	  event	  window	  of	  four	  day,	  it	  was	  a	  sixteen-­‐day	  window.	  From	  there,	  the	  aggregated	  t	  -­‐statistics	  were	  then	  tested	  to	  see	  if	  there	  was	  any	  predictable	  effect	  of	  the	  licenses.	  By	  testing	  the	  aggregate	  I	  can	  then	  speak	  about	  the	  expected	  impact	  of	  a	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license,	  if	  any	  exist.	  It	  would	  not	  just	  be	  enough	  to	  talk	  about	  individual	  cases,	  since	  that	  would	  be	  essentially	  anecdotal.	  	  
A)	  Four	  Day	  Event	  Window:	  	  	   First,	  the	  shorter	  event	  window	  data	  was	  used,	  given	  Campart’s	  comments	  surrounding	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  longer	  event	  window.	  The	  overall	  results	  for	  the	  short	  event	  window	  are	  shown	  below	  in	  Table	  1.	  	  For	  each	  event,	  the	  t	  -­‐statistic	  associated	  with	  the	  cumulative	  abnormal	  return	  is	  shown.	  This	  t	  -­‐stat	  shown	  is	  the	  t	  -­‐stat	  associated	  with	  the	  CAR	  calculated	  using	  the	  drug	  index	  (drg),	  the	  S&P	  (SP)	  or	  the	  S&P	  volume	  (SP_V).	  If	  the	  t	  -­‐stat	  is	  significant,	  that	  means	  that	  the	  CAR	  is	  statistically	  different	  from	  zero,	  which	  was	  shown	  in	  equation	  8	  (pg.	  32).	  Table	  1	  also	  shows	  how	  many	  of	  those	  t	  -­‐statistics	  were	  positively	  significant,	  insignificant,	  and	  negatively	  significant.	  Finally,	  the	  statistical	  probabilities	  for	  both	  the	  
t	  -­‐test	  and	  the	  Wilcoxon	  rank-­‐signed	  test	  are	  shown	  below,	  which	  both	  used	  the	  t	  -­‐stats	  as	  their	  data.	  The	  associated	  t	  statistic	  is	  shown	  for	  each	  event	  when	  compared	  with	  the	  drug	  index,	  the	  market	  price,	  and	  market	  volume	  (see	  appendix	  for	  information	  on	  each	  event).	  Looking	  at	  the	  summary	  of	  those	  24	  events	  for	  the	  short	  time	  period,	  when	  compared	  with	  the	  drug	  index,	  ten	  were	  insignificant,	  while	  four	  were	  significantly	  positive	  and	  ten	  were	  significantly	  negative.	  First	  off,	  the	  fact	  that	  almost	  half	  of	  the	  data	  points	  showed	  no	  significance	  underscores	  that	  companies	  may	  be	  more	  worried	  than	  they	  need	  to	  be.	  	  	  	  	  






t-­‐stats	  using	  4	  
day	  S&P	  	  
t-­‐stats	  using	  
4	  day	  S&P	  
Volume	  
1	   -­‐0.32	   0.02	   1.52	  
2	   -­‐0.72	   -­‐0.74	   1.46	  
3	   0.92	   3.05#	   2.46#	  
4	   -­‐3.34$	   -­‐2.25$	   0.39	  
5	   -­‐10.08$	   -­‐9.12$	   -­‐4.01$	  
6	   -­‐6.02$	   -­‐5.40$	   0.51	  
7	   2.90#	   5.59#	   -­‐0.48	  
8	   -­‐2.12$	   -­‐0.76	   2.14#	  
9	   -­‐8.48$	   -­‐6.74$	   2.48#	  
10	   3.08#	   2.18#	   -­‐0.18	  
11	   -­‐0.10	   1.26	   -­‐0.43	  
12	   0.15	   3.17#	   1.08	  
13	   -­‐1.45	   0.26	   0.17	  
14	   -­‐0.10	   -­‐1.00	   6.98#	  
15	   4.37#	   3.36#	   -­‐1.55	  
16	   0.53	   1.27	   -­‐2.39$	  
17	   -­‐0.95	   5.25#	   -­‐0.35	  
18	   0.68	   0.19	   0.17	  
19	   -­‐3.08$	   -­‐0.58	   -­‐1.76	  
20	   -­‐2.44$	   -­‐1.40	   0.30	  
21	   -­‐2.40$	   1.05	   -­‐3.97$	  
22	   4.22#	   6.89#	   -­‐0.60	  
23	   -­‐3.82$	   -­‐1.47	   1.34	  
24	   -­‐11.74$	   -­‐9.87$	   -­‐3.97$	  
Tstat_positive	  	  	  	  (t>1.96)#	   4	   7	   4	  
insignificant	   10	   12	   16	  
Tstat_negative	  	  	  	  (t<-­‐1.96)$	   10	   5	   4	  
T_test	  of	  t-­‐stats	   .0580*	   0.7819	   0.9121	  
Wilcoxon	  of	  t-­‐stats	   .0865*	   0.909	   0.9544	  
*=Significant	  to	  the	  10%	  level	  
	   	  Table	  1:	  Overall	  results	  for	  t-­‐stats,	  t-­‐test,	  and	  Wilcoxon	  signed	  Rank	  test	  when	  using	  shorter	  (4	  day)	  event	  window	  period	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While	  this	  was	  true,	  the	  tests	  ran	  with	  the	  drug	  index	  as	  the	  market	  did	  prove	  to	  be	  significant	  to	  the	  10%	  level.	  Additionally,	  testing	  the	  t	  -­‐statistics	  of	  the	  drug	  index	  event	  study	  with	  the	  non-­‐parametric	  Wilcoxon	  signed-­‐rank	  test	  also	  come	  out	  to	  be	  statistically	  significant	  to	  the	  10%	  level.	  All	  in	  all,	  both	  the	  t	  -­‐test	  and	  the	  Wilcoxon	  show	  a	  weak	  significance	  for	  the	  data	  in	  this	  particular	  case.	  This	  was,	  however,	  the	  only	  time	  when	  either	  the	  t	  -­‐test	  or	  Wilcoxon	  showed	  any	  significance.	  When	  examining	  the	  t	  -­‐statistics	  associated	  with	  the	  market	  price	  and	  market	  volume,	  we	  find	  even	  more	  of	  the	  events	  being	  insignificant.	  For	  the	  market	  price,	  twelve	  were	  insignificant,	  while	  seven	  were	  significantly	  positive	  and	  five	  were	  significantly	  negative.	  For	  the	  volume	  analysis,	  sixteen	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐four	  were	  insignificant,	  four	  positive,	  and	  four	  negative.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  when	  running	  these	  calculated	  values	  through	  both	  a	  parametric	  student	  t	  -­‐test	  and	  Wilcoxon	  signed-­‐rank	  test,	  they	  come	  out	  showing	  that	  compulsory	  license	  issuance	  has	  no	  statistically	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  value	  of	  the	  firm	  in	  question.	  	  Looking	  at	  these	  data	  with	  a	  four-­‐day	  event	  window,	  we	  find	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  compulsory	  license	  on	  company	  stock	  price	  seems	  to	  be	  significant	  only	  when	  compared	  with	  the	  drug	  index,	  and	  not	  with	  the	  S&P.	  That	  being	  said,	  it	  still	  does	  not	  illuminate	  to	  us	  the	  circumstances	  that	  make	  a	  license	  positively,	  negatively,	  or	  insignificantly	  impactful.	  	  
B)	  Sixteen	  Day	  Event	  Window:	  	  	   Although	  I	  tested	  the	  four-­‐day	  event	  window	  because	  of	  Campart’s	  suggestion,	  I	  also	  used	  an	  event	  window	  that	  extended	  3	  weeks	  post	  event	  (so	  16	  trading	  days),	  since	  that	  is	  standard	  	  






t-­‐stats	  using	  16	  





1	   -­‐17.95$	   -­‐20.74$	   -­‐3.07$	  
2	   -­‐11.17$	   -­‐21.10$	   -­‐4.39$	  
3	   0.41	   -­‐2.71$	   6.05#	  
4	   -­‐2.91$	   4.59#	   2.97#	  
5	   -­‐14.20$	   -­‐11.37$	   2.61#	  
6	   -­‐30.76$	   -­‐33.14$	   -­‐3.74$	  
7	   12.46#	   20.94#	   -­‐3.18$	  
8	   -­‐1.52	   -­‐23.75$	   8.33#	  
9	   -­‐14.87$	   -­‐20.34$	   5.43#	  
10	   3.39#	   -­‐10.68$	   -­‐2.30$	  
11	   7.61#	   1.79	   2.20#	  
12	   5.81#	   7.63#	   -­‐0.24	  
13	   30.21#	   34.03#	   -­‐10.67$	  
14	   1.63	   -­‐9.30$	   10.00#	  
15	   -­‐2.94$	   -­‐12.56$	   4.68#	  
16	   -­‐3.31$	   -­‐21.99$	   -­‐13.24$	  
17	   0.33	   12.03#	   -­‐1.51	  
18	   12.55#	   17.62#	   -­‐7.44$	  
19	   -­‐10.93$	   10.86#	   -­‐0.13	  
20	   -­‐5.24$	   15.34#	   -­‐6.84$	  
21	   15.75#	   20.80#	   2.07#	  
22	   7.45#	   11.34#	   0.73	  
23	   4.80#	   11.05#	   8.36#	  
24	   -­‐19.54$	   -­‐13.02$	   1.29	  
Tstat_positive	  	  	  	  (t>1.96)#	   9	   11	   10	  
insignificant	   4	   1	   5	  
Tstat_negative	  	  	  	  (t<-­‐1.96)$	   11	   12	   9	  
T_test	  of	  t-­‐stats	   0.615	   0.710	   0.944	  
Wilcoxon	  of	  t-­‐stats	   0.689	   0.627	   1.00	  Table	  2:	  Overall	  results	  for	  t-­‐stats,	  t-­‐test,	  and	  Wilcoxon	  signed	  Rank	  test	  when	  using	  longer	  (16	  day)	  event	  window	  period	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procedure	  for	  event	  studies.	  Set	  up	  similarly	  to	  Table	  1,	  all	  the	  results	  and	  information	  pertinent	  to	  the	  research	  is	  highlighted	  below	  in	  Table	  2.	  Once	  again,	  the	  t-­‐statistics	  are	  shown	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  drug	  index,	  the	  market	  price,	  and	  the	  market	  volume.	  The	  striking	  differences	  in	  values	  here	  is	  evident	  when	  compared	  with	  the	  four-­‐day	  event	  window.	  While	  11,	  13,	  and	  17	  of	  the	  events	  were	  insignificant	  with	  a	  four-­‐day	  window,	  here	  it	  is	  only	  four,	  one,	  and	  five.	  There	  exist	  two	  explanations.	  It	  takes	  the	  market	  a	  while	  to	  digest	  and	  fully	  analyze	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  compulsory	  license,	  so	  this	  longer	  event	  window	  offers	  to	  us	  a	  better	  idea	  of	  what	  effect	  they	  might	  have.	  The	  other	  possibility	  is	  that	  other	  material	  events	  are	  taking	  place	  for	  these	  companies	  and	  that	  the	  results	  we	  are	  seeing	  do	  not	  have	  to	  do	  with	  the	  license	  so	  much	  as	  other	  factors,	  which	  is	  elaborated	  on	  in	  the	  discussion.	  The	  statistical	  tests	  provide	  no	  evidence	  to	  reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  there	  is	  something	  statistically	  impactful	  occurring.	  Using	  all	  three	  sets	  of	  data,	  it	  appears	  that	  a	  compulsory	  license	  announcement	  has	  no	  statistically	  significant	  effect	  on	  firm	  value,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  we	  use	  the	  drug	  index	  or	  S&P	  price,	  or	  on	  volume	  traded.	  	  A	  similar	  lack	  of	  significance	  is	  noted	  when	  examining	  the	  data	  through	  the	  Wilcoxon	  test	  as	  well.	  None	  of	  them	  proved	  to	  be	  significant	  at	  all,	  culminating	  in	  the	  volume	  test	  with	  sixteen-­‐day	  event	  window	  actually	  having	  a	  probability	  of	  exactly	  1.00.	  Whether	  looking	  at	  the	  data	  with	  the	  t-­‐test	  or	  the	  Wilcoxon,	  it	  is	  clear	  neither	  stock	  price	  nor	  trading	  volume	  shows	  any	  significant	  effect	  due	  to	  compulsory	  licenses.	  	  
VII)	  Discussion:	  
	   In	  this	  thesis	  I	  aimed	  to	  test	  whether	  the	  issuance	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license	  had	  a	  statistically	  significant	  effect	  on	  company	  stock	  price.	  As	  outlined	  above,	  the	  only	  case	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with	  significance	  was	  the	  four-­‐day	  event	  window,	  when	  using	  the	  drug	  index.	  When	  considering	  that	  all	  other	  tests	  run	  found	  no	  significance,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  state	  that	  these	  licenses	  have	  no	  significant	  affect	  on	  firm	  value.	  Since	  using	  the	  larger	  event	  window	  removes	  any	  significance,	  we	  see	  that	  what	  significance	  might’ve	  existed	  gets	  muddled	  and	  overtaken	  by	  the	  normal	  proceedings	  of	  the	  market.	  Thus,	  I	  conclude	  that	  I	  cannot	  reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  announcement	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license	  does	  not	  have	  a	  short-­‐term	  effect	  on	  the	  market	  capitalization	  of	  the	  firm	  whose	  drug	  is	  licensed.	  	   That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  every	  case	  is	  insignificant.	  As	  explained	  above,	  we	  find	  almost	  all	  the	  cases	  having	  either	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  effect	  with	  the	  longer	  window,	  but	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  evenly	  split	  and	  therefore,	  unpredictable.	  	  	   When	  first	  establishing	  that	  short	  and	  long	  event	  windows	  would	  be	  used,	  it	  was	  justified	  with	  Sandy	  Campart’s	  paper	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  partnership	  announcements.	  In	  her	  paper,	  as	  quoted	  previously,	  she	  describes	  that	  a	  three-­‐day	  window	  would	  have	  captured	  most	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  license.	  However,	  in	  this	  thesis,	  this	  did	  not	  occur,	  given	  that	  the	  findings	  are	  very	  different	  when	  using	  the	  two	  event	  windows.	  The	  possible	  explanation	  is	  twofold.	  First,	  the	  market	  could	  viscerally	  react	  to	  negative	  news.	  This	  could	  explain	  the	  negative	  result	  found	  for	  the	  short	  window	  with	  the	  drug	  index.	  If	  any	  of	  these	  announcements	  are	  viewed	  positively,	  those	  could	  take	  longer	  to	  digest	  and	  react	  to.	  Additionally,	  there	  could	  be	  other	  things	  clouding	  the	  longer	  event	  window,	  which	  are	  discussed	  below.	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A)	  Finding	  Significance:	  	   I	  want	  to	  address	  a	  phenomenon	  I	  see	  with	  the	  data,	  which	  I	  call	  finding	  significance.	  As	  previously	  pointed	  out,	  more	  of	  the	  results	  are	  insignificant	  with	  the	  short	  event	  window	  than	  with	  the	  long	  event	  window.	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  both	  plausible	  and	  reasonable	  to	  assert	  that	  the	  higher	  number	  of	  cases	  with	  significance	  after	  sixteen	  days	  is	  not	  caused	  by	  the	  compulsory	  license	  announcement.	  Much	  of	  this	  assertion	  depends	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  you	  believe	  that	  it	  would	  take	  more	  than	  a	  few	  days	  for	  the	  market	  to	  adjust	  to	  the	  license.	  While	  a	  three-­‐week	  event	  window	  may	  be	  necessary	  for	  things	  such	  as	  complex	  mergers,	  a	  simple	  license	  on	  one	  drug	  in	  one	  country	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  particularly	  complicated	  news.	  Additionally,	  I	  believe	  that	  some	  of	  these	  firms	  do	  not	  even	  consider	  the	  licenses	  to	  be	  material	  information.	  I	  say	  this	  given	  the	  difficulty	  that	  I	  had	  in	  finding	  the	  compulsory	  license	  announcements.	  	  In	  many	  cases,	  no	  mention	  of	  compulsory	  licenses	  could	  be	  found	  on	  company	  websites,	  even	  in	  press	  releases.	  This	  illustrates	  to	  me	  that	  these	  firms	  do	  not	  think	  that	  the	  license	  is	  important	  enough	  to	  even	  inform	  their	  investors	  about.	  Investors	  often	  learn	  about	  a	  compulsory	  license	  through	  other	  news	  sources.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  I	  find	  it	  very	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  license	  is	  so	  difficult	  to	  ascertain	  that	  it	  takes	  weeks.	  Rather,	  the	  license	  is	  digested	  quickly	  and	  then	  other	  factors	  cause	  the	  effects	  within	  the	  three-­‐week	  window.	  	  Additionally,	  my	  conclusion	  stems	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  results	  are	  significant	  in	  both	  directions	  (positive	  and	  negative).	  If	  all	  the	  licenses	  were	  moving	  in	  one	  direction	  after	  3	  weeks,	  then	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  licenses	  were	  finally	  understood	  and	  reflected	  in	  the	  market.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  and	  there	  are	  roughly	  as	  many	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positive	  as	  negative	  results	  in	  the	  longer	  window.	  For	  the	  drug	  index	  comparison,	  nine	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐four	  are	  positively	  significant,	  while	  eleven	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐four	  are	  negatively	  significant.	  For	  the	  S&P	  price	  comparison,	  eleven	  are	  positively	  significant,	  while	  twelve	  are	  negatively	  significant.	  Finally,	  for	  the	  market	  volume,	  ten	  are	  positively	  significant	  while	  nine	  are	  negatively	  significant.	  From	  this,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  companies	  are	  about	  as	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  better	  than	  expected	  outcome	  compared	  with	  a	  worse	  than	  expected	  outcome.	  I	  believe	  this	  result	  shows	  that	  other	  events	  (positive	  or	  negative)	  are	  occurring,	  thereby	  impacting	  and	  diluting	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  license.	  Additionally,	  it	  could	  also	  just	  be	  strong	  random	  noise,	  however	  that	  does	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  stretch	  since	  such	  a	  long	  estimation	  window	  was	  used.	  In	  summary,	  I	  expect	  that	  something	  else	  is	  going	  on	  here	  other	  than	  the	  compulsory	  licenses.	  	  
B)	  Clustering:	  	   The	  potential	  issue	  of	  clustering	  arises	  a	  few	  of	  times	  in	  these	  data.	  Clustering	  occurs	  when	  the	  company	  data	  may	  impact	  the	  data	  collected	  for	  the	  market	  index.	  This	  may	  cause	  a	  deflation	  in	  the	  index,	  therefore	  under-­‐estimating	  the	  abnormal	  return.	  While	  most	  of	  these	  examples	  are	  single	  company,	  single	  drug	  licenses,	  this	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  In	  some	  cases,	  drugs	  are	  licensed	  which	  have	  active	  pharmaceutical	  ingredients	  from	  multiple	  companies,	  and	  who	  share	  profits	  as	  well.	  Additionally,	  there	  is	  one	  case	  when	  Indonesia	  licensed	  multiple	  drugs	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  While	  these	  cases	  of	  multiple	  drugs	  at	  once	  should	  have	  no	  effect	  on	  the	  S&P,	  there	  may	  be	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  drug	  index.	  For	  the	  Indonesia	  example,	  while	  Gilead	  Sciences	  and	  Abbott	  Laboratories	  are	  not	  on	  the	  index,	  GlaxoSmithKline	  and	  Bristol	  Meyers	  Squibb	  both	  are.	  That	  being	  said,	  there	  are	  27	  companies	  on	  the	  pharmaceutical	  index,	  so	  the	  effect	  is	  far	  from	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substantial.	  While	  this	  only	  occurs	  a	  few	  times,	  it	  could	  have	  caused	  some	  dampening	  of	  the	  overall	  effect	  when	  using	  the	  drug	  index	  as	  reference.	  Attached	  in	  the	  appendix	  is	  the	  current	  company	  used	  in	  the	  index.	  	  	  
C)	  Further	  Research:	  	   These	  results	  raise	  the	  question	  about	  what,	  if	  anything,	  determines	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  licenses.	  Further	  research	  into	  the	  companies	  who	  reacted	  well	  and	  poorly	  is	  required.	  Possible	  explanations	  include	  HIV	  versus	  non-­‐HIV	  licenses,	  acute	  versus	  chronic	  illnesses,	  the	  development	  level	  of	  the	  country,	  the	  type	  of	  illness	  that	  gets	  a	  drug	  compulsory	  license	  (type	  I,II,	  or	  III),	  the	  company	  whose	  drug	  gets	  licensed,	  etc.	  These	  questions	  harken	  back	  to	  Colleen	  Chien’s	  discussion	  of	  both	  the	  predictability	  and	  importance	  of	  the	  market.	  For	  HIV	  drugs,	  since	  so	  many	  have	  been	  licensed,	  perhaps	  the	  market	  had	  already	  taken	  into	  account	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  license.	  Similarly,	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  markets	  in	  questions,	  we	  can	  further	  examine	  what	  makes	  a	  market	  ‘important’	  and	  whether	  that	  is	  the	  determining	  factor	  in	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  license.	  	  In	  addition	  the	  development	  level	  of	  the	  country,	  the	  potential	  for	  leakage	  of	  drugs	  into	  cash	  markets,	  and	  corruption	  may	  play	  a	  role	  as	  well.	  Perhaps	  by	  identifying	  those	  cases	  and	  factors	  that	  cause	  a	  negative	  effect,	  companies	  can	  be	  more	  open	  to	  compulsory	  licenses	  that	  do	  not	  fit	  that	  bill	  and	  therefore	  will	  not	  negatively	  impact	  company	  stock	  price.	  	  
VII)	  Interviews:	  	   In	  addition	  to	  doing	  my	  own	  research	  and	  economic	  analysis,	  I	  wanted	  to	  discuss	  compulsory	  licenses	  with	  key	  opinion	  leaders	  to	  gain	  insight	  into	  the	  pharmaceutical	  side.	  I	  conducted	  two	  interviews	  in	  the	  time	  after	  my	  results	  were	  complete.	  First,	  I	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interviewed	  an	  individual	  (in	  this	  thesis	  referred	  to	  as	  Ryan)	  who	  had	  previously	  served	  as	  CEO	  of	  a	  biotech	  company.	  Second,	  I	  interviewed	  an	  individual	  (in	  this	  thesis	  referred	  to	  as	  Paul)	  who	  has	  served	  as	  legal	  counsel	  for	  major	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  for	  much	  of	  their	  career.	  The	  basic	  questions	  I	  asked	  them	  are	  reproduced	  in	  the	  appendix.	  	  
A)	  Opinions:	  	  	   As	  individuals	  who	  had	  first	  hand	  experience	  in	  the	  field	  since	  TRIPS	  and	  other	  legislation,	  I	  was	  curious	  to	  ask	  how	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  that	  their	  opinions	  on	  compulsory	  licenses	  have	  changed	  over	  the	  last	  20	  years.	  Ryan	  noted	  that	  the	  fear	  has	  certainly	  lessened	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  “practice	  suggests	  that	  compulsory	  licenses	  aren’t	  used	  very	  often”	  and	  that	  this	  outcome	  is	  nowhere	  near	  as	  detrimental	  as	  “compared	  with	  the	  known	  and	  unknown	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  compulsory	  licenses.”	  Paul	  echoed	  this	  sentiment,	  describing	  that	  “the	  nightmare	  scenario	  where	  everything	  was	  going	  to	  be	  compulsory	  licensed	  hasn’t	  played	  out	  over	  the	  past	  20	  years”	  It	  appears	  that	  my	  inclination	  that	  these	  licenses	  have	  not	  had	  a	  doomsday	  effect	  is	  echoed	  throughout	  the	  industry.	  This	  signals	  a	  large	  change	  in	  industry	  sentiment	  since	  compulsory	  licenses	  inclusion	  in	  TRIPS	  in	  1995	  and	  potentially	  also	  opens	  the	  door	  for	  more	  targeted	  use	  without	  retaliation.	  Although	  both	  did	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  hysteria	  twenty	  years	  ago	  was	  misplaced,	  they	  both	  expressed	  a	  cautious	  attitude	  toward	  compulsory	  licenses.	  Paul	  commented	  that,	  no	  matter	  how	  many	  had	  been	  issued,	  “if	  you’re	  a	  company	  that	  has	  a	  threat	  of	  compulsory	  licensing	  to	  your	  property	  you’re	  going	  to	  be	  worried	  about	  it.”	  This	  seems	  a	  reasonable	  point	  since	  it	  is	  never	  a	  good	  business	  move	  to	  have	  another	  party	  with	  access	  to	  your	  IP	  without	  your	  having	  any	  legal	  recourse.	  Ryan	  similarly	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cautioned	  about	  the	  use	  of	  compulsory	  licenses,	  but	  he	  focused	  more	  on	  the	  risk	  of	  leakage,	  “the	  concern	  that	  I	  would	  have	  is	  if,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license,	  there	  was	  an	  increase	  in	  export	  from	  that	  country	  so	  the	  cheaper	  products	  flooded	  the	  market.”	  This	  was	  touched	  upon	  earlier	  as	  a	  huge	  potential	  negative	  effect	  of	  the	  licenses,	  and	  that	  fear	  still	  holds,	  even	  though	  to	  this	  point	  it	  really	  hasn’t	  been	  shown	  to	  occur.	  With	  both	  of	  these	  opinions,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  individuals	  within	  the	  industry	  are	  still	  concerned	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  licenses.	  	  Additionally,	  I	  asked	  Paul	  about	  the	  Beall	  and	  Kuhn	  result	  pertaining	  to	  who	  was	  issuing	  compulsory	  licenses.	  While	  I	  was	  first	  surprised	  by	  the	  result,	  he	  was	  not	  at	  all.	  He	  explained	  that	  in	  these	  lower	  /	  upper	  middle	  income	  countries	  “you’re	  going	  to	  have	  huge	  populations	  who	  can’t	  afford	  the	  medicine.	  And	  you’re	  going	  to	  have	  a	  situation	  too	  where	  there’s	  not	  really	  government	  funding	  to	  provide	  it.”	  In	  essence,	  even	  though	  the	  countries	  look	  more	  developed	  on	  paper,	  the	  individuals	  who	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  suffering	  from	  diseases	  and	  illness	  may	  not	  have	  any	  more	  capacity	  to	  purchase	  them	  than	  people	  in	  the	  least	  developed	  countries.	  	  He	  sees	  developing	  nations	  using	  them	  as	  much	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  help	  drive	  down	  health	  costs	  as	  anything	  else.	  While	  this	  viewpoint	  is	  advantageous	  for	  the	  developing	  nations,	  it	  does	  sound	  like	  a	  thin	  line	  between	  misuse	  and	  abuse	  and	  using	  them	  to	  lower	  western	  rates	  on	  drugs.	  Finally,	  when	  asked	  about	  what	  other	  hurdles	  exist	  to	  getting	  drugs	  to	  those	  who	  need	  them,	  Paul	  was	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  issues	  surrounding	  regulatory	  approval.	  In	  each	  country	  there	  are	  different	  rules	  and	  regulations	  in	  order	  to	  get	  drug	  approved.	  In	  this	  model	  of	  regulatory	  approval,	  a	  lot	  of	  these	  countries	  are	  not	  worth	  attempting	  to	  get	  IP	  in	  given	  the	  high	  cost	  of	  studies.	  However,	  if	  there	  was	  a	  homogenizing	  of	  regulatory	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steps,	  this	  could	  lead	  to	  huge	  increases	  in	  access.	  That	  way,	  “if	  you	  have	  approval	  in	  the	  US	  or	  Europe,	  perhaps	  you	  could	  get	  automatic	  approval	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.”	  This	  would	  work	  unbelievably	  well	  to	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  medications	  available	  for	  people	  in	  the	  developing	  world.	  While	  there	  could	  and	  would	  still	  be	  issues	  surrounding	  pricing,	  at	  least	  enough	  new	  medications	  would	  be	  in	  the	  market	  to	  facilitate	  price	  reduction	  and	  increase	  quality	  of	  patient	  outcomes.	  	  
IX)	  Conclusion:	  	   Before	  conducting	  my	  own	  analysis	  in	  this	  thesis,	  I	  laid	  out	  the	  fear	  and	  worry	  from	  companies	  about	  the	  potential	  for	  abuse	  and	  misuse	  of	  the	  compulsory	  licenses.	  While	  this	  fear	  may	  still	  exist,	  the	  data	  does	  provide	  evidence	  that	  the	  compulsory	  licenses	  do	  not	  have	  a	  predictable	  effect	  on	  firm	  value	  in	  the	  short	  run.	  While	  they	  are	  significant	  to	  the	  ten	  percent	  level	  in	  the	  four-­‐day	  event	  window	  in	  one	  set	  of	  data,	  that	  significance	  is	  lost	  for	  the	  longer	  event	  window.	  Although	  more	  research	  must	  be	  undertaken	  to	  establish	  under	  what	  circumstances	  a	  license	  may	  be	  beneficial	  or	  detrimental	  to	  firm	  value,	  it	  is	  clear	  now	  that	  the	  mere	  issuance	  of	  a	  license	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  cause	  a	  predictable	  effect,	  either	  positive	  or	  negative.	  	   This	  result	  hopefully	  will	  join	  the	  other	  research	  on	  compulsory	  licenses	  to	  aid	  in	  decisions	  surrounding	  them	  and	  inform	  opinions.	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  company	  should	  not	  view	  any	  threat	  of	  a	  compulsory	  license	  as	  a	  negative	  to	  their	  valuation.	  Similarly,	  countries	  should	  understand	  that	  the	  licenses	  do	  cause	  significant	  negative	  effect	  in	  some	  cases,	  in	  addition	  to	  positives	  in	  others.	  If	  the	  circumstances	  can	  be	  understood,	  compulsory	  licenses	  could	  be	  more	  effectively	  used	  to	  increase	  healthcare	  outcomes	  across	  the	  globe,	  without	  causing	  a	  significant	  negative	  effect	  to	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firm	  value.	  After	  all,	  that	  is	  the	  intended	  purpose	  of	  these	  licenses.	  In	  fact,	  no	  research	  has	  yet	  been	  undertaken	  to	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  license	  on	  public	  health	  and	  health	  outcomes.	  While	  this	  question	  seems	  straightforward,	  it	  still	  has	  not	  been	  empirically	  studied.	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Appendix:	  	  A)	  Information	  regarding	  each	  compulsory	  license	  studied,	  including	  company,	  country,	  and	  date.	  	  	  
Event	  Number	   Country	   Company	   Date	  
1	   Indonesia	   Gilead	   9/3/12	  
2	   Indonesia	   Abbott	   9/3/12	  
3	   Ecuador	   GSK	   11/12/12	  
4	   Ecuador	   Abbott	   4/24/10	  
5	   Ghana	   GSK	   10/26/05	  
6	   Israel	   Biogen	   10/9/95	  
7	   Thailand	   Sanofi	   1/25/07	  
8	   Malaysia	   BMS	   10/29/03	  
9	   Mozambique	   GSK	   4/5/04	  
10	   Mozambique	   BMS	   4/5/04	  
11	   Rwanda	   GSK	   6/20/07	  
12	   India	   Bayer	   3/12/12	  
13	   Brazil	   Abbott	   6/24/05	  
14	   Indonesia	   Merck	   9/3/12	  
15	   Indonesia	   GSK	   9/3/12	  
16	   Malaysia	   GSK	   10/29/03	  
17	   Indonesia	   GSK	   10/5/04	  
18	   Italy	   Merck	   6/15/05	  
19	   Zambia	   GSK	   9/21/04	  
20	   Zambia	   BMS	   9/21/04	  
21	   Thailand	   Merck	   11/29/06	  
22	   Argentina	   Roche	   10/18/05	  
23	   Thailand	   Abbott	   1/25/07	  
24	   Thailand	   BMS	   1/25/07	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B)	  Standard	  questions	  asked	  to	  both	  Paul	  and	  Ryan	  in	  my	  interviews:	  	  
• Since	  the	  compulsory	  licenses	  represent	  end	  of	  the	  negotiation	  process,	  I	  would	  love	  to	  hear	  more	  about	  the	  process	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  issuance	  of	  a	  CL.	  What	  are	  the	  criteria	  on	  your	  end	  to	  allow	  a	  drug	  to	  go	  to	  compulsory	  licensing	  (assuming	  a	  country	  really	  does	  attempt	  to	  negotiate)?	  Does	  it	  have	  to	  do	  with	  size	  of	  the	  market?	  Sales	  of	  the	  drug?	  What	  are	  the	  criteria	  do	  you	  /	  would	  you	  consider	  when	  allowing	  a	  drug	  to	  be	  CL’ed	  or	  to	  offer	  extremely	  steep	  discounts	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  Voluntary	  license?	  	  
• Do	  you	  see	  compulsory	  licenses	  to	  be	  a	  last-­‐resort?	  Do	  you	  think	  countries	  see	  them	  the	  same	  way?	  	  
• How	  do	  you	  think	  the	  feeling	  about	  compulsory	  licenses	  has	  changed	  in	  the	  last	  20	  years?	  	  
• Following	  up	  on	  question	  3,	  Since	  the	  TRIPs	  agreement	  there	  have	  been	  somewhere	  in	  the	  30	  license	  range.	  Do	  you	  think	  this	  shows	  that	  they	  have	  had	  less	  effect	  or	  impact	  than	  first	  feared?	  	  	  
• Are	  there	  other,	  potentially	  more	  effective,	  mechanisms	  you	  can	  think	  of	  than	  a	  CL	  to	  remedy	  the	  issue	  of	  access	  without	  losing	  patent	  right?	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C)	  Components	  of	  NYSE	  ARCA	  index	  for	  pharmaceuticals	  (^DRG)	  on	  5/4/15	  	  	  
	  
	  
Ticker	   Name	  
ABBV	   AbbVie	  Inc.	  
ABT	   Abbott	  Laboratories	  
ACT	   Actavis	  plc	  
ALKS	   Alkermes	  plc	  
AZN	   AstraZeneca	  PLC	  
BMY	   Bristol-­‐Myers	  Squibb	  Company	  
ENDP	   Endo	  International	  plc	  
GSK	   GlaxoSmithKline	  plc	  
HSP	   Hospira	  Inc.	  
JAZZ	   Jazz	  Pharmaceuticals	  
JNJ	   Johnson	  &	  Johnson	  
LLY	   Eli	  Lilly	  and	  Company	  
MNK	   Mallinckrodt	  plc	  
MRK	   Merck	  and	  Co.	  Inc.	  
MYL	   Mylan	  N.V.	  
NVO	   Novo	  Nordisk	  A/S	  
NVS	   Novartis	  AG	  
PFE	   Pfizer	  Inc.	  
PRGO	   Perrigo	  Company	  plc	  
RDY	   Dr.	  Reddy's	  Laboratories	  Ltd.	  
SHPG	   Shire	  plc	  
SNY	   Sanofi	  
TARO	   Taro	  Pharmaceutical	  Industries	  Ltd.	  
TEVA	   Teva	  Pharmaceutical	  Industries	  Limited	  
VRX.TO	  
Valeant	  Pharmaceuticals	  International,	  
Inc.	  
ZTS	   Zoetis	  Inc.	  	  	  
